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Chief’s introduction
Our departing position
Situated on the wall at the main 
entrance of the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy is a memorial plaque carrying 
the names of altogether 47 former 
cadets at the Naval Academy. All were 
killed in action. These names are im-
pregnated in bronze as a token of the 
gratitude, but also as a reminder of the 
sacrifice that the officer’s profession 
might demand from the individual.
Above the memorial plaque there is 
also a crest.  A wreath surrounds the 
Norwegian flag with the brief, engraved 
inscription: For King, Country and the 
Honour of the Flag. These two symbols, 
the memorial plaque of our fallen 
colleagues and the motto of the 
Norwegian Naval Forces, underline the 
uniqueness of the officer’s profession. 
The officer carries the sole responsi- 
bility when it comes to defending 
society with military force, thus impli-
cating the large personal sacrifice, 
death as the last resort. This requires 
officers with a certain sentiment of duty 
to the Norwegian society as well as 
officers with the ability to operate and 
lead in complex combat environments. 
Extensive requirements for selection 
and education go along with such a 
complicated task. These are tasks that 
deviate markedly from requirements to 
be found in civil education institutions. 
 This document describes the Naval 
Academy’s thoughts regarding ope-
rational leadership and leadership 
training. With this we would like to 
clarify the basis for how we train and 
develop officers at the Academy. 
In order to be able to answer these 
questions, we first need to describe 
what we train and develop, and why 
we focus the way we do. 
The rationale for the Naval Academy’s 
leadership training philosophy is 
manifold. First, this represents a com-
prehensive presentation of the thinking 
and practice in leadership training that 
exists at the Naval Academy at the 
present, primarily as a basis in order 
to introduce the Navy Academy’s 
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leadership philosophy to our own 
employees and interested, external 
parties.  Second, it is my intention that 
this leadership synthesis will contribute 
to an extended exchange between 
operational departments and the Naval 
Academy regarding shared experiences, 
criticism, and expanded joint exercises. 
The synthesis has been prepared in the 
Leadership environment at the Naval 
Academy by Commander senior grade 
Roar Espevik and Commander Olav 
Kjellevold Olsen who have shared the 
joint editor responsibility.
Operational leadership - some 
reflections
Experience shows that military op-
erations represent a large pressure 
on the individual officer in the shape 
of uncertainty, fear of death as well as 
homesickness, boredom and situations 
where you may take or sacrifice life as a 
last resort. For the individual this implies 
a potential for moral and physical dis-
solution as well as wrongdoings and 
deceit. Thus the operational context 
will require a lot of the individual 
officer’s strength of character, hereby 
understood as will and ability to act 
well and wisely, also under pressure 
and in situations characterised by a 
wide range of choices for how to act.
Military history is awash with examples 
where firm and strong-willed officers 
and combat groups have been out-
manoeuvred and defeated when met 
with the complexities and uncertainties 
of war. Military performance requires 
more than strength of will and indi-
vidual character. 
The will to collaboration during large 
degrees of uncertainty therefore repre-
sents a decisive collective operational 
capacity. Here leadership represents 
the glue that binds units and indi-
viduals together, adding joint power, 
direction and wise actions. 
As a point of departure this synthesis 
states that operational leadership is 
a complicated and demanding task 
dependent on mature and competent 
leaders. It requires vessels and units to 
be “permeated” by leadership as well 
as units where leadership constitutes 
more than what is carried out by the 
formal leader.
The definition of leadership in the 
synthesis will read as a “simultaneous, 
goal- formulating, language- creating 
and problem-solving interplay between 
relevant others” (on a par with Erik 
Johnsen, 1995). This means, amongst 
others, that leadership has to focus 
on developing mature teams. Ideally 
leader dependence will be reduced 
when he or she is confronted with 
complex situations. 
These are situations where the leader 
will neither be able to have total 
overview, nor will he be omni present. 
These are also situations where the 
leader might be jeopardized at the 
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same time as quick (re)-action is 
tantamount to good effect and perfor-
mance.
Theory construction- sources and 
coherence
The  synthesis argues for a multi profes-
sion perspective on how to build good 
operational leadership. Leadership 
theory employed in military contexts 
has often been developed in a civilian 
environment such as industry or 
business life. Such “civilization” might 
endanger good leadership in that 
civilian norms might be uncritically 
transferred to the operational context. 
The synthesis thus employs a military 
perspective on leadership philosophy. 
Yet several of the approaches we use 
stem from civilian sources for “adjusted” 
applications related to the operational 
context.
It is to be noted that all (leadership) 
theory simplifies reality. Theory con-
struction will always try to find the 
balance between wanting to describe 
reality as nuanced as possible on the 
one hand and the need for simplifi-
cation to get the broader picture on 
the other. Leadership theory should 
suggest how diverse capacities act 
on each other. Beyond identifying 
relevant variables that are significant 
for effective leadership, the synthesis 
should therefore suggest cause and 
effect correlations.  An example of this 
could be transformational manage-
ment that stimulates the development 
of cohesion, which again stimulates 
situation awareness.  These cause and 
effect correlations are simplifications, 
and we sometimes tend to think that 
correlations work the other way round 
(“everything is connected to every-
thing”). The synthesis suggests, never-
theless, cause and effect correlations 
by supporting the view of regarding 
operational leadership as an interplay 
between several factors as well as 
distinguishing “the target image” for 
military leadership training.
Leadership training 
Certain qualities that are needed in 
the role as operational leader will be 
biologically determined, and as such 
the selection process rather challenges 
the possibility for leadership training. 
However, important capacities related 
to leadership might be developed 
on individual as well as on group 
levels.  Operational leadership can be 
improved, first and foremost, through 
realistic and good experience, and 
through improvement of behavioural 
patterns. Good leadership is created 
through repetition, and through 
gradual, increasing challenges. 
 A learning environment that provides 
room for “trial and error” will here be of 
importance. This implies that courage 
is needed to test new behaviour. 
Courage to challenge one’s own limits 
should be encouraged and stimu-
lated. Wrong actions ought not to be 
sanctioned in a way that would hinder 
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the individual’s capacity and will to 
continually challenge his or her perfor-
mance. Leadership training also has to 
do with developing a language that is 
adjusted to difficult situations, creating 
insight or reflection into individual 
cognitive and emotional patterns. 
Counselling and systematic reflection 
play a key role in developing emotional 
and cognitive maturity.
Structure
Chapter one starts with a description of 
military operational leadership within 
the limited context from the point 
of view that leadership is situational. 
Chapter two continues with a short 
rendition of correlations in the synthesis 
based on identifying the involved 
variables in an attempt to describe 
mutual interaction. These pages will 
provide the reader with a sufficient 
introduction to the leadership philoso-
phy at the Naval Academy.
The next part of the document (chapters 
three through nine) represents a more 
comprehensive presentation of the 
variables identified in chapter two. 
Closing off, chapter ten presents the 
core pedagogical thinking at the Naval 
Academy. In other words: how we 
think the capacities identified in the 
synthesis ought to be stimulated and 
trained.
Enjoy your reading!
Bergen 15 January 2009 
Thomas T. Wedervang
Captain
Chief Royal Norwegian Naval Academy 
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1.1. Operational “In Extremis” 
leadership
Military operational leadership, under-
stood as in extremis leadership, is a 
goal-oriented interplay tied to the use 
of power and arms in contexts char-
acterised by partially large degrees of 
pressure, its intention being to secure 
our status quo and our values
This pressure may have various shapes. 
One example might be when there is 
danger or loss of own or subordinates’ 
lives. The pressure can also be related 
to the killing or injuring of adversaries, 
or in worst case, wrong actions where 
civilians are killed. The pressure can 
also materialise as very narrow time 
margins. Often important decisions 
are made without possibility for reflec-
tion and analysis, almost as instinctive 
reactions to situational changes. This 
requires a high degree of attention and 
interaction.
An operational context is often charac-
terised by a high degree of complexity. 
This implies that the situation is non 
predictable in itself with an outcome 
that is also as difficult to predict. In an 
operational context this often implies 
that we are faced with a decisive 
situation where access to information 
is limited.  This could for example be 
a situation where loss (or salvage) of 
human lives is at stake.  In other words, 
operational in extremis leadership 
implies situations characterised by a 
short time spans, scarce information 
and serious consequences.  It implies 
that operational decisions and actions 
are often short-lived, but have long 
duration due to their consequentiality. 
Again, this represents a large mental 
load on individuals as well as for the 
collective combat group. 
The type of stress and complexity 
described here will often require an oper-
ational leadership that deviates from 
peace oriented, management leader- 
ship. 
Management leadership assumes that 
environments are predictable and 
possible to structure and control, e.g. 
through rules and procedures. In opera-
tional leadership these possibilities are 
often limited, here illustrated through 
two basic and demanding operational 
leadership challenges. The first is to 
motivate the crew to enter and stay in 
an operation over time even though the 
operation implies mortal danger with 
the moral legitimacy of the operation 
being criticized from various quarters. 
The second implies the handling of 
unforeseen and dangerous incidents in 
Chapter 1
Operational leadership
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an effective and morally justifiable way, 
running the risk of serious erroneous 
actions. Leaders are required who will 
lead ”from front” with good personal 
examples. Leaders are also required who 
possess the ability to build leadership 
processes within their force in such a 
way that leader dependency is reduced 
for the sake of the collective capacity.
1.2 Operational leadership in naval 
context
Leadership and leadership behaviour are 
situational. This implies that leadership 
variants and  leadership behaviours have 
to be adjusted to the environments and 
tasks that are faced in a given situation. 
Naval leadership has many similarities 
with other military operational leader-
ship. Some common denominators are 
time pressure, complexity, demands on 
attention, consequences etc.
Certain contextual arenas, however, 
will distinguish naval leadership from 
other leadership types. Naval warfare 
is very complex in the sense that it can 
encompass warfare in three dimen-
sions. Air, -surface, - and submarine 
threats may all knock in simultaneously, 
often combined with for example 
power projections against land. When 
Bartone (2006) identifies six sources for stress and pressure in modern 
military operations:
1. Isolation: operations in foreign environments, far from family, bad  
 home communication
2. Uncertainty (ambiguity): Unclear tasks and missions, unclear ROE  
 (Role of Engagement) and role distribution, unclear behavioural   
 norms.
3. Powerlessness: Restrictions implying that help and protection of  
 locals is impossible, likewise impossible to help family at home, 
 detailed government
4. Boredom - alienation: Lack of variation, routine, lack of 
 understanding of the necessity of the operation (legitimacy), 
 few possibilities for recreation
5. Danger: Real danger for serious injury or death (from “blue on blue”,  
 illness)
6. Work load: High number and duration of deployment, long intense  
 days in preparation, execution and post phase
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possible interior needs such as fire 
fighting and/or shipwrecking occur, 
naval warfare represents an extremely 
non-transparent and chaotic situation. 
This supports the importance of devel-
oping leadership on board that is group 
related. In the absence of the leader, 
several of the crewmembers should be 
able to execute leadership functions. 
The same applies when the situation 
calls for immediate (re)-action. This 
supports the relevance of developing 
mission-based leadership (MBL) on 
board navy vessels.
From a technological point of view, 
a navy war vessel is most advanced. 
Waging war at sea combines a number 
of advanced, technological capacities in 
the production of operational efficiency. 
There is a high level of interdependence 
within the diverse areas of profes-
sional proficiencies in the production 
of operational effect. Possible flaws in 
particular details will soon have serious 
consequences for the entire vessel. 
This  technological complexity implies 
that the leader only to a certain degree 
will be able to control or monitor the 
singular professional area in a compli-
cated battle situation.
 This dependency will first require high 
mutual trust between the players who 
will reduce the need for time consuming 
control and detailed management. It 
further requires a high level of maturity 
related to interaction and team develop-
ment. Here the leader’s and the group’s 
ability to develop mutual commitment 
and cohesion will be decisive factors. 
Naval warfare often implies fighting 
targets that are beyond visual reach. 
Missiles, torpedoes etc. are fired towards 
invisible enemies. Such warfare, called 
“faceless warfare” will make specific 
demands on moral sensitivity and the 
ability to reflect. Extensive research has 
shown that people turn more brutish 
and less considerate when they do not 
need to face the consequences of their 
known actions.
 An infantryman who kills at close range 
will most likely be affected in another 
way than an operator who fires missiles 
on board a naval vessel, albeit also 
conscientiously. The latter requires lead-
ership characterised by extremely well 
developed moral conscience in order 
that immoral and non-proportional 
power abuse does not take place.
When asked what was particularly chal-
lenging in naval warfare, an experienced 
Spanish submarine commanding officer 
answered the following:   “The loneliness 
of the commander.”  His reasons were 
that a vessel (surface vessels included) 
often operates without physical contact 
and exchange with other units over 
time. This way it is rather seldom that the 
CO will receive support from superiors 
or other CO colleagues in the mission. 
This again requires leaders who have 
the ability to endure loneliness. Thus 
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leaders are demanded who will be able 
to connect the Leader to his or her crew 
in a way that contributes to the leader 
also being taken care of. A naval vessel 
is characterised by limited space. It is 
narrow with less room for private life. 
It does not provide for the individual to 
“chill out” by jogging around the block 
or similar. This situation makes particular 
high demands on social competence in 
crew and leadership. To create a “happy 
ship” is a decisive element to preserve 
the individuals by means of empathy 
and respect. 
Navy missions are often exposed to 
continuous threats in the shape of 
demanding weather and wave condi-
tions. Weather conditions shift rapidly.   If 
the elements are mastered properly, this 
represents an operational advantage. 
They do, however, also represent perils 
such as personal injuries and downright 
ship wrecking. The naval context will, 
in other words, represent a continual 
stress situation by bad weather, regard-
less of operational threats that are likely 
to appear at any rate. 
1.3 Operational “three phase leader-
ship”  leadership 
Operational leadership encompasses 
more than the execution of perilous 
operations. From our perspective, 
operational leadership can be aligned 
across three phases: (1) Preparation, (2) 
Execution, (3) Post phase. These three 
phases are included in the responsibility 
of the operational leader, encompassing 
partly diverse leadership challenges. 
Preparation deals with coordinating 
combat groups, relationship building, 
developing collective skills, optimism, 
sense of duty and motivation related 
to the mission. Realism and pedagogy 
are here a special challenge. It is also 
important to challenge the individual 
in the combat group with guidance, 
possibly to include family relations 
in a way that enables a good send 
Figure 1: Three- phase leadership – various challenges
Preparation
-  Realistic 
 education and 
 training
-  Established  
 Pre-conditions
-  Intensity and 
 realism
Execution
-  Leadership of   
 crisis
-  Critical moments
 
-  Attention
-  Mastery and   
 meaning
Post-phase
-  Take care of  
 people - for further 
 employment - and  
 ethical demands
-  Learning through 
 experience
-  Responsibility
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off. Execution deals with maintaining 
focus and ability to act effectively in 
the given moments. This encompasses 
wisdom to act in such a way that the 
superior objectives of the mission are 
realized. Specific demands are made 
on attention, agility, mastering and the 
keeping up of motivation and purpose 
of duty.
Post phase deals with the caretaking 
of mental and physical health of the 
personnel as well as with protecting 
and strengthening the cohesion in the 
combat groups as a means to getting 
ready for the next mission. This implies 
adjustment and counselling related to a 
good “hook up” between the individuals 
in the combat group and their next of 
kin who have experienced ordinary 
Norwegian daily life during the deploy-
ment. 
This “tail-phase” also addresses experi-
ence maintenance and systematization 
as means of the continual improvement 
of operational capability. Leadership 
training aims at raising awareness within 
officers towards a comprehensive lead-
ership responsibility, enabling them to 
tackle it with proficiency.
1.4 Authentic leadership – and the 
operational context of the “dressing 
down effect”
The operational context puts the leader 
and his or her crew in a pressure zone. 
Experience shows that this pressure 
might reveal or provoke typical patterns 
of reaction among the individual for 
the benefit of “our true selves.” This 
dressing down effect requires authentic 
leadership. An authentic leader is real 
and holistic. The non-authentic leader 
will be regarded as a sort of remake 
or copy, apparently functioning as an 
original, but when scrutinized closely, 
he will appear as a hoax of sorts. This 
way leadership has turned into a type of 
play with a large discrepancy between 
the leader cum person and the role that 
is being performed. 
When encountering a leadership situ- 
ation, an authentic leader is a person 
who when executing leadership remains 
true to him or her self and his or her 
own values. This implies that personal 
strength is used in a safe and convincing 
way without any false pretence. An 
authentic officer thus possesses a broad 
behavioural register comes along as 
natural, not assumed. Hence it is possible 
to exercise role flexibility without 
seeming assumed. 
The non authentic is often characterised 
by a conflict between what you strive to 
be or be perceived as, and the person 
you display in all distinctiveness. Authen-
ticity comprises self consciousness and a 
deep understanding of yourself and your 
surroundings. An authentic officer has a 
character and an understanding of self 
that harmonize with the requirements 
that are associated with the leader role. 
For a leader this implies that he or she 
possesses a solid core with reliable and 
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effective patterns of action as well as 
porosity and humbleness regarding 
the needs and perspective of others. 
Included in this is also adjustability 
to new situations, the ability to learn 
and room for others. This authenticity 
contrasts leaders who try to play leader 
roles that only to a minor extent reflect 
the true nature of the leader. Such lack 
of authenticity will emerge as artificial 
– without generating trust. In the worst 
case, this may lead to lack of trust, 
demoralization, and dissolution of the 
battle group. To stimulate the individual 
officer’s personal and authentic leader-
ship style will therefore constitute an 
important task in military leadership 
training.
1.5. Operational leadership – art of 
the moment
Operational leadership may be regarded 
as a type momentary art. When the 
American leadership researcher Gerry 
Klein studied experienced operational 
officers and fire fighters, he found that in 
stressed situations, good decisions were 
made unconsciously without particular 
hind thought or explicit analysis of 
various alternative actions. When opera-
tional decisions and behaviour meet, 
Klein concluded that pressure and 
complexity often happen intuitively, 
based on pattern recognition. 
This type of momentary art is illustrated 
in the model below.  Such  intuitive 
ability to decide requires experience, 
team work and ability to recognise what 
is known or unknown in the moment: 
not too early (the degree of uncertainty 
being too large) nor too late (too few 
alternatives for action being left).
The model registers the lapse towards 
successful momentary action as an alert 
actions preparation where the leader 
will continually watch and monitor the 
situation.  This actions preparation is a 
type future oriented pre-wisdom which 
Figure 2: Two areas of competence – on the division between theoretical and practical compe-
tence In accordance with operational decision making and leadership
  
A-type: Power of action B-type: Power of reasoning
Operational
decisive - 
action
intuitive
action stand-by
- Implicit
- Future
- Practice based
- Quick, spontaneous
Hindsight
(Interpretation)
- Explicit
- Explanation - past
- Theoretical, reflection
- Slow
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also draws on experience, pattern recog-
nition and team work. Hindsight implies 
the understanding of what actually 
took in the given moment, in the past, 
in slow reflection, for coherence. This 
represents a type language creation 
that translates momentary experience 
into learning. In other words, a well 
functioning operational leadership 
is characterised by its competence in 
effective decision-making, based on 
pattern recognition, which requires 
practical training. A well functioning 
operational leadership is also recog-
nized as competence to activate the 
entire battle group when it comes to 
watching the situation in question, the 
latter to ensure good situational under-
standing. Such  competence feeds off 
good relations and trust within the 
group. Eventually good leadership will 
be recognized as the ability to reflect 
on one’s own choices and actions in 
common, the purpose of which is to 
be able to contribute to learning and 
improving action preparedness for 
future situations.
1.6. Four “action substances” in 
operational leadership
An important question for the under-
standing of leadership and leadership 
development has to do with what it is 
that works when the leader is successful. 
There are  four important basic “action 
substances” : (1) Behaviour (2) Language 
(3) Emotions (4) Thought. Research 
as well as general experience clearly 
shows that the leader’s  behaviour is 
of great importance when it comes 
to crewmembers’ effort and interplay. 
The leader’s (1) behaviour creates 
motivation, has a guiding effect and 
contributes to culture creation. It is also 
our experience that behaviour contrib-
utes considerably more on the crew 
than does language (“action speaks 
louder than words”). An example: 
research shows that leaders who run 
greater personal risks on behalf of the 
community will earn more respect and 
trust among the crew, being identified 
as positive role models. Leadership 
characterised by deviation between 
expressed ideals and what is observed 
as the leader’s behaviour will not be 
long lived. Positive leader behaviour 
training makes for an important part of 
operational officers’ training.
Operational leadership is also to be 
found through (2) language and 
language creation. Language creates 
reality. The leader defines under-
standing and focus through language. 
A leader who does not have concepts 
for people, vessel systems, the mission 
in question etc will soon render into 
a situation with non-addressed and 
difficult challenges. This might be due 
to the fact that the leader is unable to 
name the challenges, hence does not 
realize the actual conditions or else, 
is not able to convey problems and 
challenges. Common focus, motiva-
tion and meaning are created through 
language. Language can reveal and 
conceal.  Language has an undressing 
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and effect that does not present any 
danger. The adage “right words in the 
right hour” gains its relevance here. An 
example of important language is the 
language of ethics. The leader wants to 
fill an important role linked to creating 
motivation and sense to international 
operations. The ability to legitimise the 
mission by means of ethical arguments 
is important here. If the leader who 
displays weak language skills does not 
have the ability to reflect, he will easily 
end up in a situation where the crew 
loses the understanding of the intention 
of the mission.
The leader also influences through (3) 
emotions. Emotions create touch and 
movement. Movement can again be 
seen as motivation of sorts.  Simply 
put, it is possible to claim that negative 
emotions create negative movement, 
and positive emotions create positive 
movement. Research also shows that 
emotions are contagious. Negative 
emotions spread rapidly on a vessel 
on a par with how positive emotions 
contribute to enthusiasm and flow. An 
emotionally mature leader will recognize 
how emotions influence people and 
groups, he will recognize his own and 
others’ emotions, understanding the 
significance of these emotions. 
Leadership also implies complicated 
assessments which need cognitive 
complexity and mature thoughts, e.g. 
in the shape of situational analyses, 
or in the shape of the planning that 
takes care of diverse various interested 
parties and various needs. Research 
shows that effective leaders are good 
at stimulating their crews to alternative 
critical thinking. The leaders’ ability to 
reflect and to think clearly contributes to 
building a personal database as well as 
trust.  In this context it is important that 
the leader is capable of reflecting upon 
his/her own and others’ thinking, in 
order to be able to criticize and possibly 
change direction. Added up, these 
four action substances will represent 
important focal areas for military leader 
training. 
Emotions
Patterns of thought
Language
Action
Figure 3:  Four general focal points for operational leader training.
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A relevant and practical leadership 
theory has to build on a clear un-
derstanding of the reality and the 
situation within which leadership will 
be executed. The leadership model 
of the Naval Academy uses as its part 
of departure the fact that the world 
is complex and chaotic. Complexity 
implies that reality is difficult to predict 
and to understand. The unexpected is 
often what to expect. Chaos implies 
that the unexpected carries along a 
threat of destruction and dissolution, 
which creates fear and anxiety. The goal 
of operational leadership is therefore 
to create and sustain a collective ability 
to utilise continual non-predictive 
changes in the environment through 
fast and wise adjustments. This ability 
to adjust is often called agility.
Operational doctrines encompass 
guidelines for warfare encountering 
complexity and chaos. The Norwegian 
Armed  Forces Operational Doctrine 
regards manoeuvre warfare, combined 
with effect philosophy and a network 
based defence (NbF) as the most 
effective approach to military opera-
tions. Good operational leadership will 
thus have to promote manoeuvrability 
and effect within the framework of the 
NbF.  In the synthesis at hand we regard 
the operational doctrine and the op-
erational context as directional factors 
for further development of leadership 
theory. We also define fast and wise 
adjustments as leadership objectives: 
The question to be asked will then be 
the following: What is required in order 
that a battle group obtains such an 
adjustable ability?
Our initial answer has to do with 
motivated people: motivation to 
function in a combat environment 
where the objectives are to protect 
civilians, forcefully if necessary. Henrik 
Ibsen proclaims that no man can be 
helped if he doesn’t what to do what 
he is capable of. Good qualities and 
skills will lose their relevance if the 
competence is not followed by will, 
motivation and responsibility.  In our 
context this implies duty and motiva-
tion to offer military protection of 
Norway and Norwegian interests.
Professional identity and professional-
ism are therefore basic in all military 
leadership training. 
A professional identity implies a 
clear understanding of the societal 
duty resting on the officer’s shoulders 
vis-à-vis military leadership. Profession-
al identity touches us as human beings. 
It is characterised of a conscious and 
deeply felt personal responsibility so 
Chapter 2
The Naval Academy’s leadership model - an overview
Naval Military Operational Leadership and Leadership Training
Leadership training philosophy of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy – a synthesis
—  18  —
that country and its order might be 
protected. In other words, it should 
mean something for the particular 
officer’s definition of self that s/he con-
tributes to the protection of society. 
This way the officer will distinguish 
himself from a hired soldier or a civilian 
worker.
Are will and sense of duty enough, 
then, to obtain good operational 
leadership? We assess motivation and 
sense of duty to be necessary, but they 
do not necessarily suffice as qualifica-
tions for operational leadership. Many 
highly motivated people who possess 
a genuine interest in the military 
protection of society will lack personal 
qualifications for the mastery of such 
a demanding task.  The individual’s 
character traits will here be decisive. 
Character traits are durable denomina-
tors of the individual human being; 
a kind of non-situational “element.” 
The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy 
identifies seven characteristics for  a 
military leader, identified as “the seven 
small ones”: (1) Courage, (2) Justice, 
(3) Steadiness, (4) Wisdom, (5) Care, (6) 
Humour, and (7) Robustness. If leader-
ship and officers are characterised by 
these traits, they possess good suppo-
sitions for the execution of operational 
military leadership. 
As pointed out earlier, however, indi-
vidual character traits do not suffice in 
order to lead well. Operational leader-
ship is a skill that must be educated 
and trained. In addition to the indi-
vidual strength of character and talent, 
good leadership will demand the 
acquisition of a series of skills, adapted 
to operational requirements. We also 
envision leadership as a collective 
process. Good operational leadership 
is more that a product of the leader’s 
singular behaviour. The next question 
is therefore: What characterises good 
operational leadership?
In accordance with the Norwegian 
Armed Forces Joint Operational 
Doctrine, the answer is mission-based 
leadership (MBL). This is a type leader-
ship that makes room for, and requires 
decentralised decision making and 
actions on a par with the leader’s 
intentions, in cases where the situation 
requires this. This approach is contrast-
ed by order-based leadership where 
the subordinates’ duty to follow suit 
is dependent of how “up-dated” and 
sensible it is in the given situation. It is, 
nevertheless, important to understand 
that orders have large relevance also 
within MBL.
There is, however, no valid excuse 
for lacking judgment or wisdom 
because the leader was not present to 
issue new orders when the situation 
changed. The individual is obligated 
to make assessments on a par with 
the leader’s intention. This requires 
good leaders who can clarify their 
intentions, developing their crew’s 
ability to act independently. This again 
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requires strong discipline within the 
personnel who are encouraged to act 
and think the way the leader would 
have thought and acted if the situation 
would have demanded this (not as the 
individual him or herself would have 
preferred). MBL constitutes, however, a 
relatively generally formulated leader-
ship language. The next question is 
thus:  What type of leadership contrib-
utes to a successful practise of the MBL 
principles?
Our answer suggests a combination of 
transformation and transaction leader-
ship where the leader moves the battle 
group towards a mandatory group 
leadership. A battle group marked by 
group leadership will adapt to changes 
in the environments by changing 
objectives, work methods, role assign-
ments and at the same time contribute 
to maintaining relations and cohesion. 
This group leadership, where ideally 
everybody in the combat group 
contributes to leadership, is operation-
alised through what Erik Johnsen calls 
“leadership of the leadership process” 
and group dynamics theory (SPGR). 
This theory will say something about 
what behaviour and which roles the 
individuals and the group must occupy 
in order to survive in a complex and 
chaotic environment.
We have now made concrete what 
we regard as effective leadership 
behaviour on individual and group 
levels. The question remains if we have 
identified sufficient capacities in order 
to explain good operational leadership 
and operational effect. Our answer is 
that something is missing. 
A challenge when developing leader-
ship theory is to identify the mecha-
nisms stimulated by good leadership 
that generates production of good 
results. Which capacities are stimu-
lated through operative leadership and 
through which are these activated? 
Here we have identified seven ca-
pacities, also known as “the seven big 
ones,” which are all stimulated by good 
leadership (and vice versa: stimulate 
good leadership), contributing to op-
erational action:
(1) Cohesion is the glue that keeps 
a combat group together under 
pressure. (2) Trust is a relation, which 
makes fast decentralized actions 
and specialization possible. (3) Duty 
contributes to making the crews stay 
through their missions, meeting their 
own doubt and anxiety. (4) Morale 
retains meaning and may contribute to 
a reduction of the conflict (5) Organiza-
tion creates framework and opens up 
for decentralized and swift actions (6). 
Common mental models contribute 
to a common understanding of reality, 
coordinating attention and action. (7) 
Automated skills are necessary skills 
when officers encounter  stress and 
exhaustion.   
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With good leadership processes, what 
will the “seven big” collective capacities 
contribute to? Why are these important 
in order to create agility and opera-
tional effect? To begin with, we suggest 
that they contribute to get attention, 
stimulating action alertness, the latter 
also coined as situation awareness.
Situation awareness implies an 
up-dated and realistic opinion of both 
forces as the kind of weaknesses, pos-
sibilities and limitations one is faced 
with, momentary as well as when they 
belong to the future.  Weak situation 
awareness might activate wrong 
actions or lack of action, which again 
might have fatal consequences for the 
outcome of the fighting. You need to 
have the capability to establish and 
keep an up-dated situational picture 
as well as the capability to act vis-à-vis 
the “window of opportunity” in order 
to develop interplay where the entire 
crews ideally are actively on the 
alert. This applies to situations under 
pressure as well.
This requires that the seven collective 
capacities that activate the entire 
organization, that is, related to active 
interpretation of the situation, will be 
wisely (and often quickly) transferred 
into new knowledge and action. Here 
we suggest that for example lack of 
automated skills could “steal” mental 
focus that could have been used 
for concentrated monitoring of the 
situation. We can also imagine that a 
demoralised crew with low cohesion, 
low sense of duty and with a low level 
of leader trust will be distracted when it 
comes to contributing to an up-dated 
situation awareness.
Our final question thus remains: How 
can situation awareness translate into 
wise actions? We contend that it has 
to do with motivation and the ability 
to manoeuvre in an effective way. 
Here again the “seven big ones” will 
contribute to co-ordinated and quick 
action, through motivation and sense 
of responsibility combined with pro-
fessional skills.
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A theory and synthetic approach of op-
erational leadership have to stem from 
the reality that surrounds this leader-
ship. In this chapter we shall define 
two contextual relations that pave way 
for shaping  leadership theory and its 
objectives. These are (1) complexity 
and (2) operational doctrines.
3.1 Complexity and chaos
”Let us learn our lessons. Never, never, 
never believe that any war will be smooth 
and easy, or that anyone who embarks 
on that voyage can measure the tides 
and hurricanes he will encounter. The 
statesman who yields to war fever must 
realize that once the signal is given, he 
is no longer the master of policy but the 
slave of unforeseeable and uncontrol-
lable events. 
Antiquated war offices, weak incompe-
tent or arrogant commanders, untrust-
worthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant 
fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalcula-
tions – all take their seats at the council 
board on the morrow of declaration of 
war. Always remember, however sure 
you are that you can easily win, that 
there would not be a war if the other 
man did not think he also had a chance.” 
(Churchill in Herwig 1998:74-75).
Complexity can be interpreted in two 
ways; first as where the problem is 
indeed complex which implies that 
it can be dissolved into its variable 
components and mastered from 
there. Organization and drill are good 
answers to this challenge. Complex-
ity, however, can also mean that 
something is undecided. This implies 
that it is impossible to predict that 
linear logics (proportionality, addition-
ality, replication, causality) will only to 
smaller degrees be able to help us. The 
future of humanity is always a mixture 
of something known and something 
unknown. In military conflicts, how- 
ever, the amount of the unknown is 
often much more substantial. Not only 
because there are at least two adver-
saries that attempt to conquer the 
other, but also because none of these 
will be able to create the outcome of 
the conflict in his picture since there 
is a vast number of variables that can 
play along.
Nobody knows the outcome of a war, 
and often the outcome is ever so 
different from what the warmongering 
partners envisioned at the outbreak of 
the war (hardly anybody in WW1 had 
as their objective that three empires 
would be dissolved, nor did anybody 
Chapter 3 
Operational leadership frameworks
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write as their WW2 objectives that the 
world be parted in two, with people 
living on the brink of extinction 50 
years onwards). In modern wars this 
complexity grows: they are often 
asymmetric, seldom between states, 
and there is rarely a sharp division 
is between combatants and non-
combatants. There is rarely a sharp 
division between friend and foe, and 
often there is a blurred line between 
war and peace. There are few answers 
to this complexity. Technology does 
not help much. We can only to a small 
degree organize ourselves out of the 
problem. Military leadership therefore 
has to do with being able to live with 
chaos, being able to operate effectively 
in chaotic circumstances, and handling 
chaos better than the adversary.
Complexity has also got a positive 
side. It is through the unexpected and 
unpredictable that creativity, innova-
tion and progress take place. Chaos 
and complexity do not only open for 
destruction; it also implies possibilities. 
Organizations and leaders that are 
able to adjust are in demand; i.e. 
people who are able to read situations, 
observing mismatches between their 
own expectation of progress, and who 
will develop, adjusting their actions 
accordingly.
The border marks the location where 
the leader and the organization face 
a new situation. One is situated at the 
borderline of the known area, an area 
where experience and knowledge, rules 
and procedures do not quite suffice. 
Between the familiar and the new 
situation emanates a type no-man’s-
land. Since the situation is not already 
familiar, it is not possible to know the 
right thing to do. One is situated in a 
Normality and structure Liminality and anti-structure
Figure 5:  Brunstad’s liminality model – transgressive operational leadership
 Tradition
 History
 Stability / Order
 The familiar
 Security 
 Rules
 Structure
 Control
L
I
M
I
N
A
L
E
S
O
N
E
Chaos
Complexity
Disorder
The unpredictable
The unstable
The unsafe
The unknown
The nameless
The foreign
The angst ridden
The vulnerable
Naval Military Operational Leadership and Leadership Training
Leadership training philosophy of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy – a synthesis
—  25  —
situation of choice where road signs 
are blank. Nevertheless, one needs 
to make decisions. This is leadership’s 
true location, a place characterized 
by lack of overview, with complexity, 
chaos and at times uncertainty. In this 
operational area the leader is tested, 
and the future of the organization is 
momentary jeopardized.
3.2 The operational doctrine
“The keen sword of initiative has no place 
in the armory of those who hold the 
“Doctrine of no doctrine” (Knox: 53)
A doctrine describes guiding prin-
ciples for the approach we apply when 
solving our missions. “Guiding” implies 
that the officer has to use his/her 
professional judgment when applying 
his/her professional judgment when 
making use of the principles of the 
doctrine; i.e. a doctrine is not a recipe 
to be followed from A to Z, but will tell 
us where to focus.
A doctrine may have several objectives. 
Our joint operational doctrine (FFOD) 
is focused on internal cultural develop-
ment (FFOD p7) i.e. on what norms to 
be in effect for our joint interaction. 
The FFOD describes our culture to be 
characterised by effect, network and 
manoeuvre thinking.
 
“Effect thinking has to do with neither 
finding the right attention towards the 
result, nor the individual input nor seeing 
his /her mission in a larger context. 
Network thinking has to do with organiz-
ing all the resources in the best possible 
fashion to obtain the best situation 
awareness and systems integration.
Manoeuvre thinking implies mastering 
the psychological dimension of warfare 
by understanding warfare as a fight 
between wills, characterised by uncer-
tainty, chaos and friction.” 
The logics of manoeuvre thinking 
imply that the adversary’s will has 
to be broken down by our applica-
tion of surprise and expectation. The 
objective is to employ the complexity 
of military missions to our own benefit. 
The fact that things do not happen 
when they are expected to, are in 
and of itself confusing. One does not 
comprehend what happens in the here 
and now which makes for disorienta-
tion, something that again will have a 
negative effect on motivation during 
stress and perils. 
That being said, it is important to 
remember rule number one in all 
competition: one must assume that 
the adversary is at least as cunning 
and motivated as yourself. We must 
therefore assume that the adversary 
will try to confuse us. This requires that 
we keep our own situation awareness 
up-dated vis-à-vis what happens in our 
environment. It boils down to being 
able to stay informed in an environ-
ment that tends to be ambivalent, 
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complex, and in rapid change, all the 
while when the natural tendency 
seems to be one of disorientation.
The logics of network centric thinking 
calls for utilising the advantages offered 
by ICT in order to increase flexibility, 
and thereby increased efficiency (pt 
0453). The objective is to retrieve and 
share information (p 0450) to increase 
situational awareness among decision 
makers in the organization. Network 
centric thinking also implies focus 
on the ability to rapidly being able to 
assemble forces on an ad hoc basis (pt 
0310). It is also necessary to distinguish 
between technical and social networks 
since the possibilities offered by tech-
nology also have repercussions on 
social relations in the organizations, 
i.e. how we  are to function within the 
framework of a network. Contrary to 
a classical hierarchy where orders and 
co-ordination will have to be issued 
from up above, in a network where it 
is expected that each and all will have 
to understand how he/she can contrib-
ute to the needed collaboration and 
management. Network collaboration 
implies that not only are we supposed 
to strive for the solution of our own 
problems, but we shall also support 
others so that they reach theirs.  All the 
time it has to do with being continually 
informed, up-dated and accessable.
The essence of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces Joint Operational Doctrine is 
that The Armed Forces is a flexible 
organization. We are equipped for the 
solution of missions characterised by 
friction, uncertainty, chaos, danger 
and stress. In some situations we are 
capable of operating unpredictably at 
high speed (the manoeuvre method), 
in other situations we are predictable, 
generating trust (stabilisation method), 
often in the same operation. The 
further question is therefore: What are 
required from an operational leader-
ship that acts effectively in a complexity 
and that is adjusted to our operational 
doctrine? Our initial answer: A leader-
ship that acts pro creatively, qualifying 
people for reorganization and situation 
adjustment.
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“Agility means the ability to rapidly 
change one’s orientation in response to 
what is happening in the external world” 
(John Boyd)
“The essence of agility (…) to any form of 
competition is to keep one’s orientation 
well matched to the real world during 
times of ambiguity, confusion, and rapid 
change, when the natural tendency is to 
become disoriented”. (Chet Richards)
Within leadership research it is regarded 
as difficult to measure good leadership. 
The discussion often has to do with 
what can be measured; that which 
good leadership has resulted in. Some 
focus on co-worker satisfaction, other 
focus on leader behaviour in itself, 
other yet again put emphasis on for 
example economic revenues. 
Within our leadership theory our lead-
ership objective is the ability to adapt 
in a way that the combat group is able 
to adapt to the conflict environment 
in a favorable way, hence the notion 
adaptability or agility.
The key to master complex situations 
where an enemy seeks to beat you is to 
be mentally prepared in advance. You 
will then faster be able to see that situa-
tions change, that planned actions may 
function or not, or that mental simula-
tions of expected development may 
materialise or not. Agility has to do with 
abilities to transform and abilities to 
adapt. This might occasionally lead to 
you acting before the enemy, creating 
his reality image; occasionally you will 
let the enemy act first, accepting him 
to go wrong. Mentally you will still be 
in advance.
Leadership in complex surroundings 
will demand  capacities that can relate 
to situations in continual transition. It 
requires adaptability skills where one 
will continually learn from ever shifting 
situations. One is humble in the en-
counters with the unknown without 
letting go of one’s own core, one’s 
own memory. One enters the game 
coined by John Boyd as interaction and 
isolation (SG 36-39), where interaction 
with the environment adds agility 
whereas isolation from the environ-
ment leads to loss of information and 
loss of one’s own morale. 
The opposite of such adjustment 
might lead to the loss of one’s own 
identity, its dissolution or entering into 
an amoebic state. The good leader will 
appear in his or her ability to balance 
Chapter 4
 Adaptability (agility) as operational 
leadership objective
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on a continuum where the extreme 
points are isolation and loss of identity. 
When the Naval Academy contends 
that agility is the key to success as a 
leader, it is because, in our opinion, 
future conflicts will be continually more 
complex, rapidly changing character. 
The key also implies rapid change to 
be able to deal with adversaries using 
new and unforeseen events.  Doing it 
mentally quicker than your adversary 
– employing agility – is decisive in 
order to succeed. Ways to acts that 
promote collective transitory abilities 
will therefore be a superior objective 
of operational leadership. This implies 
first and foremost a combat organiza-
tion constituted by individuals with 
motivation and certain character traits 
where will and sense of responsibility 
are first corner stones towards a profes-
sional identity.
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“Hired troops are useless and dangerous. 
The man, who bases his state on hired 
weapons, will never find tranquillity and 
safety.   These are namely always at strife, 
full of ambitions, without discipline and 
faith; popular among friends, coward 
among enemies, they do not fear God, 
and are faithless towards people. With 
these people defeat is as certain as every 
battle they undertake…the only thing 
that keeps them in battles are the lousy 
wages they receive with which they are 
not motivated to face death for you. They 
would love to be your soldiers when you 
are not on the war path, but when war 
arrives, they will either hide or desert.” 
Machiavelli
With “identity” we understand our own 
thinking about “who I am” – how I deep 
down understand myself. The idea is 
that thought is tied to how I perceive 
and understand the world, including 
my own profession. 
 Professional identity will constitute my 
personal conscience, and the percep-
tion of who I am as an officer. This will 
answer questions like: Why am I an 
officer? What does my job entail? What 
is my area of responsibility? As a point of 
departure we contend that the profes-
sional identity has a decisive bearing on 
the motivation for the profession, hence 
also on the ability and the willingness to 
fill the officer role. 
The core of the military profession deals 
with executing the missions it receives 
from the state. The military profession 
and the organization are part of the 
state apparatus of violence which issues 
authority to execute violent acts on 
behalf of the state (privately, person-
ally, because the allied asked for it etc.) 
The right and duty to exercise violence 
requires a lot when it comes to loyalty, 
discipline, commitment, ethics and 
morale. Since the fighting military pro-
fession will encounter thinking adver-
saries with lethal intentions, courage, 
strength of will, and vigour under 
extreme suffering will be an essential 
part of the military profession. 
The enormous physical and mental 
loads connected to killing and losing 
your own soldiers require a legitimiza-
tion beyond the instrumental. It can only 
be legitimized if the large purpose is 
right and good. It is therefore necessary 
that the military profession is connected 
to a larger purpose rooted in the values 
supported by the employer (i.e. the 
State). The members of the military 
profession will thus have these values 
Chapter 5
 Professionalism - officer identity
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internalized and located in language. 
This implies that a professional officer 
will experience the mission as meaning-
ful and as an important part of his own 
self-image and professional identity. 
The professional identity will again 
contribute to responsible actions and 
professional behaviour. This can either 
happen in such a way those actions 
that conflict with the individual’s profes-
sional identity will activate negative 
emotions like shame and guilt, or 
else be actions that confirm positive 
professional identity that will activate 
positive emotions and a strengthened 
self-image. 
The military profession is also collective 
in its nature.   The profession  receives 
its missions and executes them as 
a collective unit. Individualists that 
single-handedly ask what society can 
do for me rather than what they can 
do for society will therefore occupy a 
problematic location within a military, 
violent apparatus. 
The American military sociologist 
Charles Moskos has proposed an 
assumption that officer identity has 
started to look like what we find in 
regular occupations where wage work 
has more prominence than service. 
As seen from the table below, officers 
tend to focus more on a permanent job, 
regular work hours, material rewards 
than service for the country.
 Also among Norwegian officers we find 
a large group of officers that would fit 
better in an occupational role than in a 
professional role. This is not unnatural 
since a large part of the work in the 
military organization does not deviate 
from work in a civilian enterprise. It 
is harmful, however, if this view of 
professional identity will set the tone 
in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Sub-
sequently, developing a professional 
with institutional elements will be an 
important objective for the leadership 
training at the Naval Academy.
The military profession is also threat-
ened by what is called a deprofession-
alization. Implied is the fact that the 
officers’ task range is extended to such 
a degree that their professional role 
vanishes. Officers are supposed to be 
warriors, administrators, teachers, tech-
nicians, aid-workers, aid catastrophe 
workers, police officers, humanitarian 
aid workers etc. This is a development 
that cannot be reversed, but officers’ 
ability to hold on to their basic profes-
sional identity is largely challenged.
“Other matters in the state are 
directed to the profit of individuals, 
where as the business of soldiering is 
directed to the protection of the entire 
common good. The essential distinc-
tion between those occupations that 
are professions and those that are 
not is that the former, but not the 
latter, serve the common good.”   
Thomas Aquinas
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Variable Institutional Occupational
Legitimacy Normative values Market economy
Societal member 
evaluation
Respect based on service 
notion
Prestige based on wage 
level
Role obligation Vague, generalist Specific, specialist
Reference group
Armed forces
”Vertical” within 
Armed forces
”Horisontal” with 
prefessions outside
Recruitment appeal Character traits,  
life style/orientation
Wages during 
education, technical 
capabilities
Conduct assessment Holistic and qualitative Segmented and 
quantitative
Salary basis Rank and seniority, with rank 
as governing principle
Technical skills and 
labour market pressure 
with rank as governing 
principle
Types rewards A lot of non materialistic, 
respect generating rewards
Salary and bonuses
Table 1: Institutional work identity contrasted to work relations (Based on Moskos/
Wood 1995:16)
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In his investigation “Norsk Monitor” 
Ottar Hellevik has continually 
measured value development in the 
Norwegian society from 1985 till 
today. The tendency shows a general 
shift in values from traditional values 
like security, frugality and respect 
for the law towards modern values 
like openness to “the new times”, 
women`s emancipation, techno-
logy, risk taking, diversity tolerance 
and critical approach to authorities. 
Hellevik also acknowledges a shift 
from idealism as inner focus, spiritual 
and creative values, care, environ-
ment and health towards more 
materialism with emphasis on the 
exterior - materialist and social issues 
alike. Hellevik also portrays difference 
between generations. Young people 
(15-29 years of age) are more modern 
and materialistic in contrast to older 
people (+55 years of age) with a more 
traditionalist and idealistic orienta-
tion. These changes and value might 
effect military leadership and military 
identity. Development towards more 
risk taking and openness towards 
“the unfamiliar” probably supports 
accept of foreign operations while 
contempt of rule might curb the 
readiness to follow the chief`s orders 
and intentions. The shift toward more 
materialism and ego focus might 
represent a challenge when it comes 
to developing commitments vis-a-vis 
society as well as cohesion within the 
organization.
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Operational leadership represents com-
plexity and pressure. It makes demands 
on interaction and cohesion. It also 
makes large demands on individual ca-
pacities – understood as character and 
strength of character. In the following 
we are going to present seven traits 
of character (possibly called virtues), 
also called the  “The Seven Small Ones” 
which we view as instrumental when it 
comes to individual characteristics for 
officers who are going to operate well 
in a complex, operational contexts.
Our character says something about 
what characterises us as human beings. 
It mirrors the individual and unique 
sides of our personality. Our character 
is reflected through the values, ideals 
and role models with which we try 
to identity ourselves. This is the inner 
side of character. To this there is a 
corresponding outer side. Character 
expresses itself in the way we perform 
our responsibility towards others, as 
a moral obligation, as our abilities to 
persevere the lesser evils in life, as well 
as realizing our goals. Our character is 
therefore closely linked to our identity. 
We are identified through our character 
and our exterior patterns of actions. 
Known and unknown traits of our 
character will continually coexist.. Both 
parts have in common that they seek 
to influence our actions and priorities. 
Thus our character will influence the 
way we execute leadership.
In addition to having an inner and an 
outer side, the character will also be 
static and dynamic, the static implying 
a relative solid core in our action and 
reaction patterns. In addition to this 
stabilizing point of gravity, there are 
also more dynamic elements. This 
shifting aspect is due to the fact that we 
all the time have to relate to the shifting 
element of the environment.
 Requirements and challenges in the 
topical situation make adjustments of 
habits and action patters necessary, 
frankly in order to be able to tackle the 
shifting circumstances in which we are 
situated. Without the flexibility in this 
field, a person could have been said to 
have a problematic character, well, in 
certain situations a lacking ability to pay 
attention to one’s environment could 
be seen as an expression for a flaw 
in character that might lead to  rigid 
leadership.
Simultaneously, however, if there’s no 
stability, no static aspect of our character, 
we would be capricious, unpredictable 
Chapter 6
 “The Seven Small Ones” – characteristics for 
operational leadership”
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and free-floating individuals, without 
the means to build lasting relations and 
the lasting trust with others. Character 
must be rooted and flexible at the 
same time. The characters, which an 
operational leader should strive for, can 
be summed up as seven character traits 
– also called virtues.
6.1 Wisdom – phronesis
The most important of all virtues is 
wisdom, in Greek phronesis. The distinc-
tive character of wisdom implies that it 
is situation oriented and tied to man’s 
intellectual capability. That does not 
mean that it is a theoretical proportion 
in itself. Wisdom challenges thought, 
but its goal is to understand the 
concrete and the practical. Therefore 
wisdom is also called practical wisdom. 
Here Aristotle emphasises wisdom as 
kairos, or timing, where the right means 
are used at the right time, in the right 
number and intensity to reach the goals. 
In operational leadership wisdom is the 
art of the moment, not at least due to 
high risk (potential damage extent and 
probability) and lack of information, 
which characterises the situation.
Good leaders may use wisdom to check 
if the situation is known, and thus let 
routines and habits have the right of 
way, or, if the situation is new, they can 
demand other solutions. Such an ability 
to read the situation will be decisive for 
its solution. If one only looks for the old 
in a new situation, one will attempt to 
solve it according to old habits, routines 
and rules. Everything is done correctly, 
but everything turns out wrong. To look 
for the new in the new, for subsequently 
to be able solve it in new ways: This is 
the nature and strength of wisdom.
6.2 Justice
Justice is a fundamental moral capacity. 
It is difficult, yet possible, to imagine a 
moral action, which at the same time 
is also unjust. Justice has to do with 
a distribution of rights and duties, 
benefits and burdens that are fair, 
where everyone gets his/her share 
or what he/she is entitled to. Justice 
unites a community while injustice 
carries in itself a potential for dissolu-
tion. An experience of injustice often 
creates strong negative emotions; in 
the worst case dissolution of good will 
and community. Research shows that 
a leader’s ability to balance diverse 
players’ duties and rights in a way that 
is regarded as just will be decisive for 
the creative and keeping of mutual co-
operation between strangers. This is not 
the least relevant in a network centric 
defence where many players are linked 
together.  The experience of justice is 
just as important in a battle group as 
between units in a mission – and as the 
last resort, between conflicting parties.
We operate with various types of 
justice. We distinguish between justice 
of procedure, which focuses on a just 
decision process, justice of distribution 
which focuses on just allocation of 
goods and duties, and justice of interac-
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tion which focuses on just recognition 
of effort, attention, and care taking of 
the individual.  Eventually, justice of 
information will provide good informa-
tion about the bases for decisions, 
plans etc. Shut off from information, 
the individual will soon experience a 
type isolation and seclusion; a feeling of 
not being worthy of any explanations. 
For all these types of justice there is an 
understanding that everybody owes 
something to the other. This implies 
that regardless of what type we are 
talking about, we are committed to 
each other. No one can reach beyond 
this obligation. If one were to do that, 
one would act unjustly, thus letting the 
others down.
The perspective of guilt turns more 
visible if we study it by ways of the 
English word duty, in the expression 
to do one’s duty. Duty is derived from 
the Latin debitus/debitum which 
means guilty/trespasses. To begin 
with, I am not creditor, but debitor. In 
a community where all owe each other 
something, and everybody is willing to 
pay their debts, everybody will receive 
what is rightfully his. Justice is a kind of 
eco(nomy)-system that is always unbal-
anced, over which we are constantly 
summoned to watch . If we are not 
awake, we will stumble, in the act of un-
balancing, and things might break. To 
obtain balance in these books will then 
be tied to everybody being alert whilst 
being doing his/her duty: without duty, 
no right.
Several studies show that officers’ pre-
suppositions for making just decisions, 
particularly in complex and pressured 
situations, will vary to a large extent. An 
international publicized study under-
taken at the Naval Academy also shows 
that ability to principled justifiable 
thinking is an important component in 
transformational leadership. 
6.3 Courage – fortitude
Antiquity connected courage with the 
officer and to good performance of 
violent power. To protect society rests 
with the officer – and the courage of the 
battle group. Courage is in other words 
a condition for survival. If the nature 
of wisdom is to find the best means of 
realizing a higher good, then courage is 
the fearless contribution that you need 
when conquering the obstacles that 
threaten the realization of this goal.
 A moral without courage would not be 
a moral. Courage will aid you in doing 
the right thing. Moral is not first and 
foremost theory: it is action. The Latin 
word for courage is fortitude, and is 
closely connected to the adjective fortis. 
Fortis is used to denote a character trait. 
It corresponds to the Norwegian adjec-
tives kraftig, dyktig, energisk, modig, 
uforferdet, staut, djerv and tapper. 
There are semantic remnants in our own 
synonym for castle, namely a fort (like 
we also know it from English). A fort is 
built of strong walls, situated on a ridge. 
This way it is able to protect what is 
inside. Fortitude is the notion of mental 
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strength that can indeed withstand 
attacks that will endure danger and 
tolerate pain.
To be found in courage is a certain con-
fidence that life  resists placement in a 
formula.  The haphazard and unpredict-
able are some of life’s characteristics. 
What we believed was dead certain, 
was maybe not so certain after all. 
What we didn’t believe in, won terrain. 
What we gave everything for, let us 
down in the last instance. As its point of 
departure courage emanates from what 
the Greeks called tyche: contingencies, 
chance, and the unpredictable. The 
world is not quite safe, but then again, 
it will never be. In this lies a surrender 
to something that is larger than one 
self. From a theological perspective, it is 
natural to find hope and faith in God’s 
providence and care, underlining the 
significance of courage.
 It is difficult to lead a courageous life 
without at least a belief that the good 
will prevail. Joined with this hope lies a 
persistent and resilient faith in believing 
that good is stronger than evil, and that 
good will prevail in the long run.
In antiquity courage is the road from 
cowardice on the one hand and over-
weening pride (hubris) and foolhardi-
ness on the other. Aristotle describes 
these ditches the following way: Who 
flees from everything and for everything 
will not be able to endure anything, 
will turn cowardice whilst whomever 
nothing fears will lash out at everything 
but will only gain overweening pride. 
Again, it is the ideal of the middle way 
that represents the classical ideal.
 Attached to this idea, however, is to 
walk along just roads that do not follow 
crooked paths in order to trick others. 
Many show boldness in the pursuit of 
individual gains, but this is not the true 
road of courage. Only the one who is 
just can be courageous in the true sense 
of the word. Like cowardice courage is 
contagious; something that is spread. In 
this lies a particular leader responsibility. 
The courage of the leader will nourish 
the unit’s courage and vigour.
6.4 Temperance
Temperance is about being able to 
insert a delay between impulse and 
action. To keep back a bit, wait off, in 
order to stem impulses characterised 
by self-focus and possible rage and 
destructive emotions. This way temper-
ance serves as a buffer against reduced 
ability to assess. Whereas wisdom will 
relate to the surroundings, temperance 
is more of an inner character trait. The 
focus is not on the situation, but on the 
person.  Critical and corrective assess-
ment of individual motives and action 
preferences will open up during this 
postponement.
Temperance is in itself not a realization 
of the good life, but a precondition 
for it. Discipline, moderation, or the 
art of tempering oneself, will open a 
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room into the good.  In temperance 
impulsivity might be stemmed which 
again may have a damaging effect 
related to superior goals.  Rage from 
the local population in a Peace Support 
Operation  serves as an example of this.
In these introvert looks lures indeed 
a new type of self-centeredness. The 
danger of getting so comfortable 
around one’s own inner peace might 
result in a limitation of self and of being 
caught once again. It is therefore not 
without reason that this virtue has 
emanated as self-virtuousness’ stan-
dard-bearer: I have full control and can 
make do without the other.  Moderation 
can thus not unexpectedly give raise 
to relational and destructive conceit 
including contempt of others who do 
not to the same extent master their 
own idiosyncrasies and inclinations: I 
have succeeded at restraining myself; 
you have not.
In Latin the virtue was translated with 
temperantia, which again goes with 
tempus, i.e. time. Temperantia has to do 
with being able to await further instruc-
tion, letting things get adjusted, letting 
the singular item find the place where 
it belongs. Without time to restrain, 
acting wisely is difficult. It goes without 
saying that wisdom and temperance 
are intimately connected. In temper-
ance the leader will also allow space for 
the other. By refraining from individual 
points of view, space is admitted the 
other. This weighing of clarity and 
dominance on the one hand, and of 
transparency and humbleness on the 
other, is an important balancing act in 
operational leadership.
6.5 Care
While justice asks questions of what 
is a reasonable distribution of rights 
and duties, and what the individual 
is entitled to, care will ask what the 
individual needs. Focus here is on the 
individual’s emotions and needs. Here 
justice is tempered with mercy. The 
caring leader will ease the burden of 
the individual, at times regardless if 
it is deserved or not. Care conditions 
empathy in the other’s emotions, and 
will contribute to help the other on his 
or her premises. Care blends in with 
justice. While justice contributes to 
keeping an organization gathered at a 
balance between rights and duties, care 
will provide for the up keeping of close 
relations. 
While justice may seem “cold,” care is 
“warm.” Balancing between justice 
and care is important, particularly for 
leaders at higher levels, in other words 
balancing between closeness and 
distance. A leader with some degree 
of care, but with a minor capacity 
for justice, will be endangered when 
practicing soft leadership, which again 
contributes to dissolve cohesion  when 
inequalities are experienced. A leader 
with a well developed sense of justice, 
but with less care, might run the risk of 
creating a cold and impersonal climate 
where case will override person.
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6.6 Humour
The French philosopher Andre Comte-
Sponville contends that “whomever 
lacks humour, also lacks humour, 
humbleness. He also lacks clarity, 
lightness and he is too much preoc-
cupied by himself. He is too imposed 
by himself, he is either too strict or too 
aggressive, and therefore lacks nearly 
always mildness, charity and compas-
sion. There is something suspicious 
and alarming about too much serious-
ness.”  Positive emotions are aroused in 
humour, particularly when we are faced 
with the difficult and threatening. 
A leader without humour is a sad leader. 
Leadership characterised by humour 
will be able to initiate positive drive and 
optimism on the expense of sadness and 
misery. Positive emotions also opens up 
a human being, makes it responsive 
to new experience and other people 
while negative emotions will close and 
capsule the other person within him 
or her self. Learning and development 
will thus feed on positive emotions that 
again will feed on humour.
Experience from concentration and 
detention camps has shown that 
humour, often as sardonic humour, is 
able to explain mastery and survival. 
This is underlined in humour’s paradoxi-
cal truth: the situation is hopeless, but 
not serious. We also know that humour 
is contagious; lifts us up,  uniting us. 
Humour is not the opposite of serious-
ness, but rather a precondition for the 
other. This might explain research that 
alleges that humour is often tied to in-
spirational and good leaders, while lack 
of humour is often tied to destructive 
leaders.
A person who always jokes, however, 
is not humorous, but rather cowardice. 
Irony is not humour, but rather a 
weapon that is nearly almost pointed 
at our fellow human beings. Irony is 
the evil, sarcastic damaging laughter; 
a hurtful mockery able to kill. Irony will 
scorn, accuse and judge. Irony is narrow-
mindedness that views everything in 
black and white.  Humour, on the other 
hand, will laugh at itself or of the others 
like itself, always including itself in that 
which brings about laughter. 
According to Kierkegaard irony is 
self-assertion while humour is self-
annihilation. Humour is neither serious-
ness (where everything makes sense) 
nor indifference (where nothing makes 
sense), but something in between. 
The more important areas of our lives 
humour is directed at, the better and 
more profound  the humour. 
Humour helps us see our surroundings 
and ourselves in a less threatening and 
grave perspective, often by objects 
being reinterpreted from one walk of 
life to another. 
An often-quoted example from Freud 
refers to an American undertaker adver-
tisement: “Why die today when you can 
be buried for 10 dollars!”
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6.7 Robustness
Faced with war and conflict as well as 
stressful and demanding workdays, the 
individual is challenged  to function well 
in action as well as in reasoning. Both 
will and abilities are prone to succumb 
when faced with war and troubles, in 
spite of various types of mental and 
physical refuge: away from oneself, 
away from difficult situations. This 
ability to master and adjust to situations 
where one is confronted with resistance 
and negative experiences is called ro-
bustness. Without this trait of character, 
all the other character traits are easily 
irrelevant in an operational context.
Robustness can be compared with 
elasticity in metal. Some iron is hard, 
and breaks easily while other types of 
iron are softer and can be bent without 
breaking. Research and experience 
have taught us that this ability will 
vary among individuals. Some resist 
more. The robust officer counteracts 
negative experiences, adjusting to the 
new demands imposed by the new 
situation. Robust people are optimistic 
and energetic, often curious and open 
to new experiences. Robust people 
are often good at developing positive 
emotions, often by employing humour 
and positive thinking. They are char-
acterised by hope, faith and optimism 
related to the future, even in demanding 
situations.
 Through maintaining positive emotions 
(like joy, satisfaction, interest) the indi-
vidual’s ability to think and act from a 
broad range is widened, as opposed to 
when negative emotions (anger, hatred, 
irritation and apathy) will reduce the 
individual’s think-action area (the latter 
because negative emotions often 
lead to quick decisions that close any 
wider orientation). Faced with stress 
the robust leader will be able to define 
positive sense when encountering 
rather meaningless experiences.
A basic attitude (also defined as a 
personality trait) is hardiness that can 
explain parts of a person’s robust-
ness. Hardiness contains three main 
elements: 1) Challenge, 2) Control, and 
3) Commitment
1) Challenge has to do with a belief 
that change in itself is exciting, and can 
lead to personal growth. We identify an 
appetite for life when breaches of con-
ventions give possibilities, and where 
negative experiences are perceived 
as possibilities for learning. Normally 
the negative is turned into something 
positive. 
2) Control implies the belief that it is 
possible to influence incidents that 
occur. Powerlessness is replaced by 
an experience of control, both by the 
surroundings and by oneself. This is not 
about being control freak, but rather 
when feelings and thoughts are tied 
to the attitude of “I can do this” of “I can 
influence.” 
3) Ultimately, commitment contains 
an ability to involve oneself, privately 
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as well as professionally. This involves 
attention, focus and presence. Instead 
of being distanced or alienated, a 
person will be responsible, he or she is 
curious, and displays joy when assuming 
responsibility. This type of commitment 
will go hand in hand with the capability 
for self-motivation and endurance. 
6.8. The significance of virtues and 
character – a summary
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship 
between the seven character traits. 
Even if they are all connected through 
an inner dynamics of sorts, there are 
certain traits that have a stronger 
relation to each other than anyone 
else.. It is natural that robustness forms 
a foundation at the basis of the model. 
Robustness adds a durability that 
creates space in order that other traits 
can function in a pressured operational 
context. At the top, at the opposite 
end of robustness, we find wisdom. 
Wisdom encompasses a situational ad-
justment and proper action marked by 
good timing. In wisdom the remaining 
character traits are delivered to the field 
of practice. This way the remaining 
virtues become useful helpers on their 
way to develop wisdom.
Care and justice both address the care 
taking of others. They are, however, 
placed on the opposite side of the 
model, as a warm and a cold part, respec-
tively. These are supported by humour 
and temperance. Humour is placed 
closest to care, as a “risk-free,” inclusive, 
and containing quality whereas temper-
ance is placed next to justice as a cooling 
quality that will aid  the decision maker 
to a sensible balancing act before action 
is carried out. Courage represents the 
very engine in the strength of character, 
and will therefore occupy a central 
Figur 6: ”The seven small ones” – character traits to strive for
ROBUSTNESS
WISDOM
Ca
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position. It puts things in motion, 
transforms thoughts and intentions 
into practice. Thus courage is situated 
right below wisdom, both as energy 
and support, but also to illustrate that 
wisdom ought to inform courage  in 
order that courage does not venture 
into overweening pride. 
 Virtues’ primary purpose is not as much 
occupied with man per se, but with his 
of her capability and power to force him 
or her to look away from him or herself.   
Through this re-focusing man can forget 
about himself for a second. This is what 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger 
refers to when he employs the German 
notion “Gelassenheit” . In this moment 
of self-forgetfulness individual interest 
is let torn off, and thereby also the 
destructive power imbedded in the fear 
of losing oneself, and what one person-
ally clings on to. In this view, when will 
and emotions are directed towards the 
environments, man is about to open up 
to the situation and to him or herself. In 
this openness the basis for one’s own 
humanity will be found. 
Borders will be closed if he or she too 
one-sidedly focuses on him or herself, 
thus verging on losing oneself. By for-
getting oneself, one will, paradoxically, 
find oneself: by continually thinking 
of oneself, one will lose oneself. In a 
military perspective the opposite is the 
goal, hence  virtues and strength of 
character have a decisive factor.
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In the Norwegian armed forces mission 
based leadership (MBL) has been iden-
tified as the most suitable leadership 
philosophy. This emphasizes decentral-
ization and requires vigour when we 
are faced with emerging opportunities 
in order to turn battles into our favour. 
However, MBL is a overriding philoso-
phy, which requires to be made  further 
concrete in order to be implemented. 
In other words, we lack language about 
the type leadership behavior and the 
type leadership that are needed in 
order to practically carry out MBL. Royal 
Norwegian Naval Academy operates 
by using three different leadership 
theories that we regard as mutually 
interlinked and interactive.
As a point of departure we emphasise 
inspirational transformational leader-
ship as a condition for developing 
adjustable and effective battle groups. 
Underlined here is the leader’s re-
sponsibility to develop community 
commitment, procreation of opinions, 
creative thinking, care, independence 
and vigour. In addition we value 
transaction leadership for preparation 
and follow-up of expectations and 
demands. However, operational leader-
ship is too complicated that this will be 
regarded as solely a leader’s commit-
ment. A battle group where the leader 
has a decisive impact is vulnerable and 
static. This is the reason why we follow 
Erik Johnson who emphasizes that 
leadership is leadership of a group 
process where the entire crew will 
ideally actively contribute to the lead-
ership process.  This way continuity is 
secured in the leadership process, even 
if the leader gets killed or when the 
situation turns out to be too complex 
for one person to comprehend and 
control everything simultaneously. 
This also requires a mature group with 
a high degree of role flexibility where 
leadership implies more than what the 
leader does. It also secures leadership 
in situations where direct orders are 
absent. A considerable leadership 
challenge is here to develop a mature 
group that is permeated by leadership. 
The leader turns into “the first mover” 
carrying the main responsibility for 
initiating and maintaining develop-
ment. The question is, however, what 
happens in a mature group with a 
collective leadership process?
The Naval Academy implements group 
leadership within the SPGR (System-
atize Person Group Relation) theory, 
which regards group performance 
Chapter 7
The leader and the leadership process
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as a type behavior. Role descriptions 
are connected to group dynamics. 
This theory identifies which behavior 
and role registers that are needed to 
perform well. At its most sophisticated 
level it operates with 24 behavioral 
levels, which more or less promote 
interaction and group achievement. 
In the following chapter we are going 
to describe mission- based leadership. 
This will be broken down in transfor-
mation and transaction leadership as 
the “creational process” for effective 
group leadership.
7.1. Mission-based leadership
“Never tell people how to do things. Tell 
them what to do, and they will surprise 
you with their ingenuity.” (General 
George S.Patton)
Mission-based leadership (MBL) 
has been shaped to function ef-
fectively during most circumstances. 
MBL departs from the fact that in most 
cases it will be of most worth to have 
a decentralised organization to obtain 
the flexibility that is required to master 
uncertainty in missions. MBL gives 
possibility to take advantage of initia-
tive, flexibility and speed to encounter 
shifting environment in a co-ordinated 
way. The leadership philosophy opens 
up for taking advantage of the cre-
ativity in the entire organization, not 
just the leaders’. The objective is that 
the person with the best situation 
overview (situation awareness) will 
act independently according to the 
leader’s intention. MBL implies that 
subordinates will be assigned to a 
mission, which they have to find out 
”Certain to win”
Blitzkrieg is often mentioned as the 
grand example of organizational ef-
fectiveness. The mastery of the chaos 
of war constituted the strength of 
the German military organization 
which thus was able to utilize this 
when encountering the enemy. The 
organization possessed a high degree 
of adaptability, thus operating with 
utmost decentralization. In stead of 
detailed governing, mission where 
given and the executor could by and 
large select his method of choice. In 
order to be able to operate effectively 
and decentralized, strong cohesion, 
reciprocate trust (“Einheit”) and pro-
fessional skills (“Fingerspitzengefül”) 
were preconditioned. It was necessary 
with a common outlook on what was 
to be attained in order to be able to 
issue a mission without supervising 
the line and action. Trust, cohesion 
and professional expertise were thus of 
less value if they did not constructively 
contribute to solving the mission. The 
organization also needs to know what 
they are going to attain by solving the 
mission (“schwerpunkt”). Only then 
will the mission aquire direction, force 
and meaning. ( Richards 2004.)
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how to solve him or herself, i.e. within 
the framework of a superior leader’s 
intension or intent. The intent will 
give the subordinate the sense of the 
mission, adding the Leader’s thoughts 
of what there is to obtain. The intent 
will be assigned explicitly to a mission, 
and stays permanent. The mission con-
stitutes the concrete objectives to be 
reached by the subordinates. How the 
mission is executed is left to the subor-
dinate’s tactical faculties. The governing 
principle in MBL is the mission. The 
intent is the glue that makes the entire 
organization act co-ordinately. When 
the intention is understood, discussed 
and internalized within each individual, 
it will create a common understanding 
of the intension. 
The standards of  independence, to 
show initiative, and as the last resort 
to be able to act contrary to mission 
execution, do not imply that principles 
of subordination are removed, but 
the subordination is connected to the 
leader’s intention, and not necessarily to 
the concrete wording in the executive 
plan. Any such deviation must be 
transmitted to the leader in question 
as soon as possible. If any adjustments 
are to be adjusted, the subordinate 
will have to be able to argue for his 
actions by referring to the intension 
of his mission. MBL does not exclude 
use of detailed orders and control with 
subordinates. Situations may occur, 
where control with the situation from 
the highest command is necessary, 
and our conduct will in these cases 
be characterised by predictability. But 
extensive use of detailed rule will over 
time be regarded as an undermining of 
trust relations within the organization, 
and thus destructive for the will to take 
responsibility and act on one’s own 
initiative. Holf (p 76 in Military Leader-
ship) maintains the following: “If I use 
too much superior control and negative 
sanctions, I will create fear and unrest. 
It will be easier to try to avoid error than 
opting for good results.”
Even if MBL describes what has to be 
present when facing uncertainty and 
complexity, there is not enough said 
of how to make this happen. In this 
respect it gets very important to attain 
clarity into what type behavior and 
manners that will promote trust, inde-
pendence, flexibility and initiative. Our 
first approach is the transformational 
leader and Bass (1985)’s full range 
model for leadership behavior.
7.2 Transformational leadership, 
the full range model and “the first 
mover”
7.2.1 Transformational leadership
The substantial element in transforma-
tional leadership implies that the leader 
or the leader and his/her collaborators 
together, turn focus away from narrow 
self interest to collective commitment 
where each individual contributes to 
the realization of the missions and 
visions of the organization. Transforma-
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tional leadership deals with developing 
the crew to becoming participants in 
the leadership process on board or in 
the department. The leader’s behavior 
will be decisive in creating such a 
development. The leader will in turn be 
the “first mover” in the development 
from a leader managed “autocracy” to 
a process founded on a collective lead-
ership process. To make this happen, 
the leader ought to focus on four 
areas. He or she has to be a good role 
model (idealised influence), must be 
able to motivate others, managing to 
stimulate the thinking of others (intel-
lectual stimulation), and will need to 
be considered, when accommodating 
each individual’s needs and faculties 
(individual consideration).
1. Idealised influence
A leader must be willing to take risks, 
on his and others’ behalf. He or she 
must act in such a way that there is 
correspondence between life and 
learning. Through his/her actions, the 
leader must display the high moral 
standards, which govern his life. Such a 
leader will be perceived as a good role 
model and be object for admiration, 
respect, instilling respect. 
2. Inspirational motivation.
A leader must formulate missions and 
visions where co-workers are involved 
to the highest possible extent, and 
she or he must be closely engaged 
in the follow-up. This generates co-
workers with ownership and relations 
to a visionary and attractive future 
workplace. A leader is expected to 
communicate with conviction and 
commitment. He must be clear on 
the expectations that he nourishes 
for his co-worker.  This creates security 
regarding what is expected as it simul-
taneously increases motivation and 
commitment. Such a leader will give 
his/her co-workers duties that verge 
on what the individual is capable of, 
yet with this challenge their under-
standing and experience of sense will 
increase
3. Intellectual stimulation
By inviting their co-workers to question 
established truths, reformulating 
problems, finding new approaches, 
the leader will be able to spurn new 
thinking, increasing individuals’ capa-
bilities. This must not be destroyed by 
public criticism even if the co-workers’ 
opinions might deviate from the 
leaders’.
4. Individual concerns considerations
The leader will pay attention to the in-
dividual co-worker’s needs for mastery 
and progress by also performing as 
councillor. He or she will authorise 
the subordinates, delegating tasks 
that are part of developing his/her 
co-workers. These tasks are simultane-
ously followed up in order to assess if 
the co-workers need further support 
or instructions. This happens without 
co-workers experiencing any surveil-
lance. This way the co-worker will be 
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successively developed into a higher 
potential in a supportive climate. 
“Management by walking around” is 
practised for the sake of visibility and 
to be able to reach out to the individual 
on a personal level.
A transformation leader inspires to 
commitment, motivating others to do 
more than they had originally planned, 
often even more than what they 
thought was possible. In spite of the 
fact that this represents the ideal, the 
leader will encounter situations that 
require a relationship of exchange or 
transaction in order to accomplish the 
task. This is the case when a particular 
exterior pressure makes everybody 
yield extra or when nobody sees any 
reason or meaning with what is to be 
done, and there is no time to explain 
or let anybody else into the situation 
(transformation).
7.2.2. Transactional leadership. 
Traditional leadership theories all build 
on a common, fundamental view on 
leadership where leadership is a type 
of social transaction or a change of 
values between leader and co-workers. 
Such a relationship of exchange be- 
tween leader and subordinate that 
results in satisfactory mutual interests 
is called transactional leadership. Trans-
actional leadership carries out this by 
means of “sticks and carrots.” Executing 
transactional leadership implies that 
the subordinates agree to, accept or 
comply with the leader. This is traded 
with recognition, rewards or resources, 
and is done to avoid punishment or 
other disciplinary consequences. In 
sum, it is possible to say that while the 
transformational leader emphasises 
“what you can do for your country”, the 
focus of the transactional leader will 
be “what your country can do for you”. 
Transactional leadership is in other 
words driven by exterior motivation 
either through conditional rewards 
or through active “leadership by 
exception.”
1. Conditional reward
This constructive type of transaction 
deals with administrating rewards con-
ditioned by certain actions. The leader 
will assign/create consensus regarding 
missions, will promise one type reward, 
and will distribute this in exchange for 
satisfying performance by the indi-
vidual.
2. Leadership by exception – active
This corrective type transaction is a 
reclining leadership where you only 
exceptionally interfere where minor 
deviations from standards (blunders 
and errors) are discovered. Correction 
or various types of disciplinary means 
are used when the desired results from 
the subordinate are not obtained. This 
leadership is divided between active 
and passive, dependent on the active 
scrutiny for errors or if irregularities or 
the corrective work is merely carried 
out when actual problems have 
occurred. Research shows that active 
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control behavior might be necessary in 
for example situations characterised by 
large risks and pressure.
7.2.3. Passive avoidant leadership
This is dysfunctional leadership where 
the leader to a large extent avoids 
showing leadership even if the need for 
leadership is large. This leader behavior 
represents a bad role model, and a lack 
of knowing how to take responsibil-
ity that does not correlate with the 
requirements that are demanded from 
operational leadership. This approach 
consists of two types of behavior.
1. Leadership by exception-passive
Here the leader intervenes and corrects 
behavior if faults or shortages have 
occurred.  This is leadership behavior 
that combines focusing on flaws and 
shortages with a basic passivity. Only 
the types of mistakes that have reached 
the leader’s attention will activate a 
type corrective behavior. 
2. Laissez-faire leadership 
Laissez-faire means absence of lead-
ership, also called non-leadership. 
Contrary to transaction leadership, here 
is no transaction between leader and 
co-worker. 
The leader avoids staking out course, 
necessary decisions are postponed; 
action is held off till the last minute or 
neglected altogether etc. Leadership 
responsibility is ignored, often through 
a concentration of last minute cases, 
and authority remains unapplied.
Effective
Ineffective
Passive Active
Fre
qu
en
cy
Transformation leadership 4 Is
II Idealised influence
IM Inspiring motivation
IS Intellectual stimulation
IC Individual concern
Transaction leadership
CT Constructive transactions
LWE - A Leadership with exceptions 
- active
LWE - P Leadership with exceptions 
- passive
No - leadership
LF Laissez - faire
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Figur 7: The full range model for leadership (ill exerpted from Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2003 p 
356)
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7.2.4 The full  range leadership model
The full range leadership model il-
lustrates that a wide range of behavior 
may be characterized as leadership, 
from transformation leadership on 
one end to avoidant leadership on the 
other. According to the model a leader 
will more or less employ seven types 
of leader   behavior, which again are 
more or less suitable for developing 
team leadership and good operational 
leadership.
The model is normative, based on three 
dimensions. The horizontal dimension 
is read from active to passive. 
According to the model, transforma-
tional leadership is the type behavior 
that will most radically different from 
“the laissez-faire” model. The vertical 
dimension stretching from effective to 
ineffective will show which leadership 
behavior that is generally regarded as 
the most effective. Meta analyses that 
include studies with more than 4000 
respondents show transformational 
leadership to be effective and “laissez-
faire” leadership to be least effective.
The third dimension (depth) shows 
how often the singular leadership 
behavior types ought to be employed. 
From the figure we can read that 
the most effective leader rarely uses 
non-leadership; he gradually uses 
transactional leadership, but most often 
she or he will use the four components 
of transformational leadership. Such 
individual leadership behavior will 
develop a crew that will change from 
being solely lead to being active and 
positive contributors in the leader-
ship process itself. This has largely 
to do with the dynamics from large 
leader dependency to leadership 
that involves a common process. This 
is often described as team or group 
leadership.
7.3 Leadership in the group: team 
leadership
Successful execution of mission-based 
leadership will be the result when sub-
ordinates in all ranks have performed 
disciplined initiatives based on the 
leader’s intent to solve a given mission. 
This decentralisation, or empower-
ment, will give the leader a certain 
responsibility to develop leadership 
as a collective process. This implies 
that “relevant others” (i.e. co-workers 
who with an eye for requirements of 
the situation, will take responsibil-
ity, putting it into action on a par with 
Through a 360o  evaluation by mean 
of the assessment tool “Multifactor 
Leadership Questionnaire” (MLQ) the 
singular cadet may have transforma-
tion, transaction and laissez-faire 
behavior revealed, and areas of 
improvement may be identified for 
those who wish to develop leader 
qualities. Several published studies 
show that Naval Academy cadets 
constantly develop transformation 
leadership during their studies.
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the leader’s intention) contribute to 
“playing him good” through continual 
monitoring and possible adjustments 
to ensure that the unit’s actions 
are adjusted to the given mission. 
Everybody may contribute in the 
process, given that they wish to “play 
on the winning team” with the capa-
bilities to occupy various (leader) roles 
that are adjusted to the requirements 
of the mission. 
Any group who would like to work as 
a team (i.e. three or more people with 
a common goal, and who are able to 
interact in order to reach this goal) 
have to fine-tune their expectations 
and power structure in order that 
various people’s contributions in the 
leadership process will be accepted. In 
other words, it is decisive that group 
posits 1) a range in action competence 
that entails that the group is able to 
fill several roles tied to the leadership 
missions, 2) individuals who wish to 
perform and contribute regardless 
of formal rank, and 3) people with 
capacities to read changes in the given 
mission, and who are  able to activate 
new effective actions due to this. 
The description of leadership as a 
team process, where everybody is re-
sponsible for good leadership, breaks 
with preconceived theories held by 
some. The idea that everybody shares 
responsibility may be regarded as an 
undermining of the leader’s respon-
sibility as leader. This is not a correct 
understanding. The leader will always 
have a superior responsibility that 
leadership processes are constructed 
and function  for the leadership devel-
opment as well as for the group itself.
However, experience shows that units 
which obtain a collective leader-
ship process have larger capacities 
for mastering shifting and complex 
missions: they contribute to setting 
good goals, they select effective 
methods, they employ a purposeful 
language, they contribute to motiva-
tion and meaning, and eventually, they 
establish and uphold requirements for 
behavior. This applies especially over 
long stretches of time where sleep is 
scarce, and where the level of stress is 
high. Moreover, ever more advanced 
technology and an increased profes-
sionalism make it impossible for 
leaders to be experts in every area. 
Subordinates today are to a much 
larger extent than earlier experts in 
their own professional areas. Slightly 
exaggerating, one could claim that 
military leadership today is so compli-
cated and so important that it cannot 
be executed by the leader alone.
Consequentially, we bring along 
the following questions: How well 
equipped are we at bringing out the 
individual member’s brainpower and 
vigour? How will we best co-ordinate 
our resources, making our endea-
vours powerful when confronted with 
external demands? In other words, 
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what characterises the dynamics of a 
good operational team? Ultimately: 
how can we be aware of the dynamics 
and the leadership process in our own 
group? 
7.4   SPGR  - a description of the 
mature battle group
SPGR (Systemizing Person Group 
Relations) is a tool for the understand-
ing, analysis and classification of group 
behavior.  The SPGR is important for 
the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy 
since it provides information about 
relations between individuals at 
behavior levels in groups. As long as 
leadership is defined as a goal-defin-
ing, problem-solving and language 
creating interplay with relevant others, 
the Naval Academy is going to need 
SPGR. The theoretical foundation of the 
SPGR model is based on Bates’ work on 
social systems (1950), on Bion’s work 
on the emotionality in groups (1953), 
Parson’s groups functions (1953) and 
Mills’ work on group’s development 
(1984). The SPGR model itself has been 
further developed by SYMLOG (Bales 
1979), implemented by Olav Skårdal 
and Endre Sjøvold at the Norwegian 
University for Science and Technology 
(1984). Research testifies that human 
group behavior can be defined and 
categorized in a limited number of 
dimensions, common themes and 
functions. These functions or dimen-
sions are called basic group functions 
and are shown in figure 8.   
Figur 8: Basic group functions
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The model’s logics are to be under-
stood along the following lines: Any 
group that works with a specific task 
needs to share goals and plans to 
ensure progression and productivity. 
Themes and behaviours that deal with 
structure, rules, authority, procedure, 
progress, and “this is the way things 
are done here” will have the common 
denominator CONTROL (blue). Over 
time, however, any group will need to 
preserve and maintain the social bonds 
in the group; this applies in particular to 
battle groups under continual pressure 
and stress. 
Activities that are directed towards the 
interpersonal are called CARE functions 
(green), encompassing behaviours like 
care, relationship building, acceptance, 
listening and empathy. So far this may 
remind of the old adage: “Solve the 
mission, take care of your men.” Com-
plexity implies shifting situations and 
terrain. Unpredictable occurrences and 
changes demand that the group ask 
questions about how things are done, 
and if the present solutions are valid. 
This presupposes ability to positive 
criticism. 
When we experience criticism, conflict, 
influence, resistance and struggle for 
power, it is the function OPPOSITION 
(red) that rules. Such behavior can be 
de-energising and counter-productive, 
but are occasionally necessary for 
the reorientation of the group, which 
has to find new and better solutions. 
The group will, nonetheless, have to 
agree on getting something done. 
Somebody will need to sit down and 
actually do the job. This requires both 
cohesion and a type dependency 
between the members. Adjustment, 
loyalty, acceptance, obedience, and 
follow-up of decisions are typical 
for DEPENDENCY’s (grey) functions. 
Fig 9: Immature withdrawl vs mature synergi
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In a new team most will stick to the 
behavior that they have previously 
perceived as well functioning. A typical 
structured person will show more blue 
behavior, while others might laugh and 
joke around as in green behavior. Every 
person contributes with the behavior 
at which they perceive they are best 
functioning. We contend that this type 
of team is characterised by a low level 
of maturity called WITHDRAWAL  (dark 
grey). Productivity is never very much 
larger than the sum of the individual 
contributions. At the other end, it is 
possible to imagine a mature group 
because the climate and interaction 
patterns in mature teams are such that 
anybody in the group can be caring, 
dependent, controlling or in opposi-
tion according to the circumstances. 
This is the opposite of withdrawal, 
and is called SYNERGY (yellow). In 
mature teams on is not afraid of honest 
exchanges of opinion where nothing 
is left unsaid or tested. This group has 
a large capacity to activate necessary 
behavior to adapt to the situation, both 
in terms of external adjustment (by 
utilising changes in the environment 
to their own benefit) and regarding 
internal integration (by maintaining 
cohesion and interplay in the battle 
group). An objective for operational 
leadership is to move the battle group 
from a non-mature withdrawn position 
towards a mature and adjustable 
synergetic stance. Figure 10 shows 
how people who are part of a group 
may be depicted in the SPGR room. 
In other words, by filling in a behavior 
assessment of yourself and the others 
in the group you can obtain a graphic 
Figur 10: 
The SPGR 
room.
Naval Military Operational Leadership and Leadership Training
Leadership training philosophy of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy – a synthesis
—  54  —
depiction of behavior in the group, e.g. 
before and after a demanding exercise. 
Persons in the group are noted as same 
coloured circles of various sizes that 
denote influence in the group.  The 
circle’s distance from the centre to the 
edge will reflect the frequency with 
which this behavior appears. The group 
will thus receive a good picture of its 
behavioral patters with relative place-
ments for the individual members of 
the group.  This information may now 
be used for further growth and devel-
opment both for the group and for the 
individual members. 
The group may for example assess how 
individuals with small circles may be 
able to contribute more. It can also tell 
the person who always cares to display 
a more task-oriented behavior. All the 
time the intention is to create closely 
linked teams with clearly defined 
mission foci that can perform under 
varied conditions. We employ other 
and more detailed reports on both 
group and individual levels, yet all 
use the six described group functions 
as their point of departure. We shall 
further proceed by studying one of 
these: the flexibility profile.
7.4.1 An example of application of 
SPGR analysis – within a Norwegian 
norm
Below we can see an example of how to 
apply the SPGR on the individual level. 
The figure is a print-out of behavior 
which the individual team members 
experience that the person in question 
displays in the every day class room 
situation. This may present a point of 
departure for an action plan where he 
or she may collect certain behavioral 
areas that one wishes to improve. The 
person is then allowed to function as 
leader for the same group that gave 
the first profile (figure 12), but now in 
a complex exercise. After the group has 
carried out the mission, a new SPGR 
report is generated and the person 
who was previously leader will now 
receive a profile as shown in figure 13. 
In this case it is now possible to observe 
how his performance is reflected in the 
profile. The area of behavior has been 
widened and several vectors have 
been strengthened on a par with what 
was needed in the given situation (see 
e.g. TASK ORIENTATION, CLARITY, and 
EMPATHY).  
The essential element is that the 
other group members, by knowing 
the action plan in question, are able 
to support the person who practises 
a new behavioral trait by counselling 
and giving feedback as they go along. 
Being more than an individual exercise, 
leadership training this way turns into 
a dynamic interplay between all group 
members. 
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Figur 12: Classroom behavior
CLARITY
Strict humourless pedant, 
demands obedience at ant 
prize, rules and restrictions 
are to be followed.
TASK ORIENTED
Diligent, industrious, formal 
and disciplined,  “correct” , uses 
established procedures when 
performing tasks
SELF ASSERTION
Unfriendly,  
dismissive,  
isolated, self-
centered,  
indifferent,  
“full of him/her 
self”.
ENGAGEMENT
Inspiring, trustworthy, 
friendly, engages others in 
goal directed and egalitarian 
cooperation
OPENNESS
Forthcoming, sincere, 
pleasant, informal,  
humane, no status 
seeker
EMPATHY
Change maker, warm at heart, 
helpful, worryless, happy, en-
couraging, harmonious, secure, 
personal
CREATIVITY
Spontaneous, non-traditional, 
creative, direct, unconsentrated, 
intuitive, emotional
REVOLT
Wilful, unstable, cynical, 
reckless, routine dropper, 
both self asserting and 
self denying
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Figur 13: Behaviour in operational leader role
CLARITY
Demanding, humorless, 
controlling, is always 
“right”, follows rules and 
procedures.
TASK ORIENTED
Sensible, professional, 
committed, just in control, 
impersonal, routine oriented
SELF ASSERTION
Dismissive, stubborn, 
egotistic, distanced, 
unfriendly, aggres-
sive, insensitive
ENGAGEMENT
Inspiring, trustworthy, friendly, 
engages others in goal direct-
ed and egalitarian cooperation
OPENNESS
Forthcoming, sincere, 
pleasant, informal,  
humane, no status 
seeker
EMPATHY
Confident, helpful, contact 
seeking, open, conflict shy, 
benevolent
CREATIVITY
Multi angled, happy, imagina-
tive, spontaneous, immediate, 
inspiring, non-conventional
REVOLT
Wilful, unstable, cynical, 
reckless, routine drop-
per, both self asserting 
and self denying
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We often think that good leadership 
behaviour creates good results, in 
other words, that there exists a direct 
link between leadership and results. 
However, extensive research in the 
leadership field has during the last 
decades focused on so called median 
variables (such as mediators and mod-
erators). These are variables that are 
influenced by leadership behaviour, 
and which again influence group per-
formance and result. 
For example, there is a lot of research 
that shows that good leadership 
influences the level of trust in a group, 
which again influences performance 
under pressure. This way leadership 
will influence the results indirectly. In 
the following chapter we are going to 
identify and describe seven median 
variables that we contend are both 
influenced by leader behaviour (and 
the other way round: will influence 
leader behaviour) and, as we see it, 
will function as contributors to opera-
tional performance. These variables are 
presented as seven collective capaci-
ties, “the seven big ones.”
8.1 Cohesion
Military leadership never takes place in 
a vacuum. Military leadership happens 
together with others. The group is in 
focus, not the individual performance. 
In military contexts the individual 
is always subjugated the group and 
the group is always subjugated a 
larger community. This collectivism 
emanates from the notion cohesion. 
Cohesion is what joins the activity with 
every single member of the group, the 
group’s leader and the larger organiza-
tion. Cohesion is the group members’ 
care for each other simultaneously 
while the group is being goal focused. 
Cohesion is the members’ unlimited 
trust in each other while they are 
threatened, together with the willing-
ness to hold diverse opinions, to be 
able to discuss loudly, challenging 
each other when needed.
Through well-developed cohesion the 
group will persevere the horrors of war; 
without cohesion the group will disin-
tegrate when faced with the reality of 
war. A crew or a military unit that is im-
pregnated with high cohesion will be 
able to pull off a stronger battle force, 
will sustain the battle longer, will focus 
on the group’s missions, will be creative 
when encountering war’s challenges 
and will be able to preserve the mental 
and physical health of its members. A 
task force without cohesion will experi-
Chapter 8
“The Seven Big Ones” as collective building 
blocks for operational effectiveness
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ence high dissertation rates as well as 
violent conflicts between officers and 
soldiers. They will often have substance 
abuse problems, and extremely high 
PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) 
numbers. It is therefore important to 
have military leadership that under-
stands the significance of cohesion and 
how it can be built.
8.2 Trust
A pillar within cohesion is trust. This is 
also the pillar for military leadership on 
which mission based leadership will be 
The importance of cohesion came 
in focus in the aftermath of World 
War 2. The large study of American 
World War 2 soldiers (Stouffer et al. 
”The American Soldier” 1947) found 
that what made soldiers fight were 
not secondary concepts like country, 
flag, democracy etc., but the close 
experience of being part of a combat 
group where nobody wanted to let 
each other down. Shils  and Janowitz 
(”cohesion and disintegration in 
the German army” 1947) apply the 
same to the German soldiers; their 
unique ability to keep fighting ef-
fectively after they had realized they 
had lost was only to a minor degree 
connected to secondary concepts, 
but was tied to comradship where 
nobody would deceive each other. 
Dessertations and surrender never 
took place before the group had 
been blown apart and members 
scattered.
Cohesion was once again brought 
to our attention after the American 
defeat in Vietnam. It was alleged that 
the Americans lost because their 
armies were dissolved. Dessertation, 
mutiny, “fragging” (blue on blue) and 
drug abuse (more than half of the 
soldiers admitted to having used 
drugs the last 14 days, 32 % had used 
heroin) showed an army without the 
capacity to fight where the glue that 
had held the organization together 
was gone (Gabriel and Savage, 
“Cohesion and disintegration in the 
American Army “(1976) and “Crisis 
in Command” (1978)). On the other 
hand, studies of the adversaries 
Vietcong and North Vietnam showed 
that when encountering the most 
modern and awe inspiring army in 
the world, they realized that they 
could only win by superior leader-
ship and cohesion. This led to the 
construction of the most cohesive 
army to ever enter a war. (William 
Daryll Hendersen “Why the Vietcong 
thought” (1979) and “Cohesion - the 
human element in Combat (1985)). 
One might argue, pointedly, that 
no army that lacks cohesion will 
win a war, and that cohesion might 
compensate for inferiority in most 
material preconditions.
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based. (MBL, see further description). 
Trust is the key to decentralization, the 
key to unplanned interaction, the key 
for taking advantage of competence, 
the key for initiative and vigour. 
Trust must exist on different levels- it 
has to be personal between those 
who interact personally, rooted in a 
common dedication to each and the 
missions to be solved. The necessary 
willingness to assume responsibil-
ity is also included here. Trust is the 
contract that keeps officers, soldiers 
and society together; that the people 
trust the officers’ moral integrity and 
military competence, creates the basis 
for professional autonomy, the right to 
exercise judgment when encountering 
a complex reality.
Without trust the military organiza-
tion would be a battlefield invaded by 
lawyers, bureaucrats, journalists, rules, 
and controllers all struck by paralysis 
when faced with the unknown. Trust is 
therefore something that needs to be 
present if the Norwegian Armed Forces 
are going to succeed in operating 
decentralised, in a  reality of continual 
change. An important and necessary 
part of the officers’ education is 
therefore about the importance of 
trust, it is built and may also easily also 
get lost. 
8.3 Duty and obligation
Obligations grow from a sense of 
belonging and dependency. Without 
community, a sense of needing each 
other, there will be no duties. While 
the nuclear individual manages 
well by asserting her or his rights if 
anybody feel obligated towards them, 
a community will disintegrate if its 
members act as nuclear individuals. 
The duty is therefore fundamental 
for the leadership view in the Armed 
Forces, mission-based leadership (MBL)
MBL emphasises initiative – which is 
nothing but experienced obligation 
to act. MBL emphasizes responsibility; 
this is nothing but an experience of 
obligation to solve the mission, for the 
community. MBL emphasises trust, 
which is nothing but believing that 
everybody else experiences the same 
obligation as oneself. 
When soldiers are willing to kill and 
willing to die, it can only be motivated 
through the obligation that they 
feel. Without the experience that 
community, is worth fighting for, the 
obligation will of course be perceived 
as very vague. A fundamental task 
in all military leadership develop-
ment is therefore to strengthen the 
experience of community (cohesion) 
on a small scale as well as strength-
ening the feeling of belonging to 
the larger community (the Armed 
Forces), anchoring this in the largest 
community (the nation). 
Contrary to obligations are rights. What 
my community owes me, I am entitled 
to. If, however, the organization (where 
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people assert their rights) is more pre-
occupied with rights than obligations, 
it will probably never be able to exit a 
conflict as the winning party.
8.4. Morale/moral
Operational morale is important and 
difficult. Morals deal with realizing the 
good. The good is here defined as what 
is just, and/or caring. The moral subject 
(which is supposed to “be good”) is 
ideally a combination of intentions, 
the action in itself, and consequences. 
This is a strict requirement. The effect 
of our actions, however, will always be 
an important focus in missions, given 
the large potential for destruction 
that exists in the execution of military 
power.  In operational morale we will 
therefore always put specific demands 
to the officer regarding the conse-
quences that go along with decisions 
and actions. 
Operations where the battle group’s 
actions have large and probable (po-
tentially destructive) consequences for 
others (and such clear moral standards 
do exist) represent moral intensity. 
Research shows that crew and subordi-
nate in such situations are particularly 
attentive to the way the Leader tackles 
moral challenges.
Moral border failures will here influence 
heavily on the leader’s integrity, 
influence and effectiveness and for the 
development of unit morale. Experi-
ence shows that moral failures from 
e.g. the leader will very soon generate 
very negative emotions, loss of sense 
and apathy, which again can lead to 
disintegration of the battle group. 
This contributes to a drastic restraint 
of the ability to reconstruct  situation 
awareness and vigour. On the other 
hand will just and caring leadership 
contribute to cohesion, motivation and 
the commitment of others.
Moral actions under pressure therefore 
constitute decisive leadership com-
petence. The good operational leader 
emerges as a moral role model, par-
ticularly in situations where morale is 
demanding. This way, by inspiring in 
the faculty of the example, the leader 
will influence and develop the moral 
standard of the unit. Showing courage 
and justice by choosing individual 
risk to help and support others that 
are dependent of our support is an 
example of this. This includes the pos-
sibility to retract, or to do short cuts, 
which would reduce our own risk (on 
behalf of others). Research shows that 
leaders who are willing to engage in 
personal risk and strain are regarded as 
inspirational and effective.
We view a moral action from two 
perspectives; the momentary action, 
and the learning from hindsight and 
the creation of meaning (ethics de-
velopment). The moral action can be 
regarded as a result of four processes 
that are all necessary, but not sufficient 
as conditions for morale. These four 
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competences constitute a superior 
objective for the Naval Academy’s 
education and training in operational 
morale. Failure in one of the processes 
may lead to moral failure.
1. Moral sensitivity: The ability to 
perceive moral challenges in the op-
erational leadership situation. 
This is a condition for activating the 
moral thinking and assessment, and is 
demanding in an operational context 
that encompasses a large number 
of tactical, technical, political and 
leadership-oriented elements.
2. Moral assessment: The ability to be 
able to generate and assess various 
action alternatives, and to be able to 
find the best alternative, possibly as 
an intuitive process. Research shows 
that there are big differences between 
officers’ ability to mature moral assess-
ment.
3. Moral motivation: The ability to 
motivate for the moral choice, even if 
other alternatives might encompass 
personal and self-interested gains: 
e.g. failure to tell on immoral practise 
in order to be black listed regarding 
further career.
4. Moral implementation: To act morally 
is often demanding and will often “cost” 
individual risk and unpleasantness. 
This may result in internal resistance. 
A moral leader must thus have the ca-
pacities to inspire and instigate moral 
choices. He/she must have abilities to 
carry out these choices even when met 
with resistance. Sometimes one also 
needs the guts to destruct a possible 
opposition. 
To retain morals in military missions 
is decisive for maintaining the unit’s 
fighting morale and their experience of 
meaning. Moral is also important when 
it comes to taking care of mental health, 
including also battle capacities. Also in 
psychological missions morale plays a 
key role; immoral practise on “ground 
level” will often have very negative 
effects – on a strategic level as well. An 
operational leader, and a battle group, 
there need to pay particular attention 
to moral turn off mechanisms, which 
often contribute to (subconsciously) 
conceal immoral.
8.5. Organization
An organization is a planned coop-
eration of people who intend to reach 
certain goals. In other words, it is a 
group of people who when facing a 
task will require a collective contribu-
tion; the task is too big for them to be 
solved individually. To allocate tasks is 
the simple part; the challenging part is 
to co-ordinate the individual contribu-
tions.
Structure is what creates bonds 
between the different tasks of the 
organization, between the objectives 
one works toward, and between the 
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people in the organization. Structure 
will decide who talk together, what is 
talked about, and how one approaches 
and solves the various tasks. There 
are numerous ways of organizing, but 
some approaches are better adjusted 
to certain types of tasks. In a predict-
able world we can imagine that both 
the allocation of tasks and how one 
chooses to co-ordinate the contribu-
tion could have been done relatively 
permanently.
 These types of organizations are called 
bureaucracies, and are reckoned to be 
effective in predictable environments. 
This does not imply that leadership is 
redundant; organizations fall apart all 
the time, and it will be a leadership 
challenge to keep up motivation and 
focus. In an unpredictable world it 
will be difficult to create a permanent 
structure for the execution of missions. 
Then we speak of organic organiza-
tional structures, which imply what we 
know as task organization: elements 
that are organized in relation to the 
mission to be solved.
Network will be the extreme point in 
an organic design. This again implies 
that we have to co-ordinate our efforts 
to open up for local solutions, what 
we call mission-based leadership. 
Crises, conflicts and war represent the 
greatest leadership challenges for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces. In this area 
an organic design for command and 
control would function best. If many 
participate, the capacities for observa-
tion and orientation will be largely 
strengthened. The organization will 
then need to have more flux where 
informal structures operate jointly 
together. As a condition to implement 
MBL and manoeuvre capacities, it will 
be necessary to create a flexible, yet 
solid organizational structure.
8.6 Automated skills
Military operations are about imposing 
our will on our adversaries by means of 
weapons and violent force. Basic skills 
within basic functions (Command and 
Control, joint contribution, intelligence, 
mobility, protection and logistics) are 
therefore decisive to solve missions 
and survive. This applies on the in-
dividual basis as well as in the battle 
group.  These skills are only relevant 
when they function in pressured situ-
ations over time.
This requires automated skills – ready 
at your fingertips when your body tells 
them to. A condition for executing 
automated skill is to possess profes-
sional competence. Experience shows 
that various types physical and psycho-
logical deprivations are the norm in the 
armed forces. In parts of or throughout 
entire operations one might encounter 
conditions like sleep deprivation or 
physical and mental exhaustion.  Such 
deprivations particularly affect areas 
that require a lot of attention. They 
are also to be found in areas that 
require new learning, new generating 
Naval Military Operational Leadership and Leadership Training
Leadership training philosophy of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy – a synthesis
—  63  —
of assessments of new action alterna-
tives. Psychological conditions like 
for example humour and optimism 
may have a similarly negative affect. 
In other words, a large spectrum of 
human functions is heavily reduced 
under such circumstances. We know, 
however, that drilled automated 
actions have an unusual durability 
when encountering physical and psy-
chological deprivations. 
Behavioural patterns that will last also 
through exhaustion can be developed 
through drill and hyper learning. 
These are situations that are crucial 
for survival. This way attention power 
is liberated in a way that strengthens 
situational awareness. A substantial 
operational leadership challenge is 
hence the development of relevant 
drill exercises
It is equally important  to develop a 
culture that values and emphasizes 
skill training, drill and hyper learning. 
Through drill and hyper learning a 
capital is created which proportionally 
augments with the wear and tear of 
the battle group. Drill and automated 
skills can be regarded as good habits, 
reaching beyond technical proficien-
cies. It also reaches into the social 
interplay, incorporating actions of care 
and the prevention of physical and 
mental injuries. 
A particular leadership challenge will 
in this respect be to motivate for drill 
when faced with boredom. Another 
one is to stimulate for drill on the one 
hand, and manage to release creative 
problem solving on the other. A unit 
that is solely based on drill and pro-
cedures without having any particular 
ability to improvise will endanger itself 
in its predictability, and would easily be 
put out of action.
8.7. Common mental models for suc-
cessful co-ordination and situation 
awareness in teams
Teams must have a high degree of 
maturity in their interaction in order to 
meet a complex and dynamic exterior 
world. Officers must hence be able 
to create trust and govern interplay 
between people. This is, however, not 
sufficient for performance in a dynamic, 
insecure and complex environment. As 
a whole, the team must have a high 
degree of situation awareness. In our 
opinion, two factors are important 
when we aim for high performance 
proficiency: the ability to learn and the 
ability to co-ordinate quickly. 
To obtain a close to real situational 
awareness with quick adaptation 
ability, it is required to have teams 
that posit and are able to create good 
mental models of the system and the 
environment. Rouse and Morris define 
a psychological model as a mechanism 
which people use to make descriptions 
of a system’s (as e.g. the OPS room on 
Nansen) purpose and shape, explana-
tions of the systems’ functions and 
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observed state as well as to predict 
future system states. Cognitive psy-
chology has emphasized that mental 
models and their description of how 
people interact and cope with the 
world, is significant. It is claimed that 
these psychological models enable 
people to draw conclusions, predict 
actions, understand phenomena, 
choose alternative actions, and control 
system performance and to experi-
ence happenings in a number of ways 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). This is illustrated 
in figure 14 .
Teams that are supposed to perform 
must therefore be able to explain and 
learn about the exterior world through 
and of each other. The best teams will 
be the teams that are able to bring the 
out the “differentness” in members’ 
perspectives (perception and cognitive 
abilities) when creating mental models. 
Otherwise the team will be prone to 
one person’s orientation and thinking. 
This will also increase the possibil-
ity to understand and discover when 
something is out of sync (Boyd’s “mis-
matcher”). In other words, important 
changes have taken place. (level 1: 
situation awareness).
Judith Orasanu found that flight crews 
who used quiet periods to think and 
discuss possible scenarios (“What do 
we do if”-thoughts) performed way 
better during high intensity periods. 
Canon-Bowers and Salas explain this 
with a mechanism they have coined 
“common mental models.” They 
contend that good teams develop 
common mental models that enable 
them to predict each other’s behaviour 
and needs. 
This makes them capable of support-
ing and correcting each other, coordi-
nating efforts towards a common goal. 
Team with well-developed common 
mental models are implicitly able to 
co-ordinate their activities. They do 
not need to talk to each other that 
much because they understand the 
tasks, the equipment, the situations, 
the responsibility, and they also have 
a common outlook on team members’ 
Figure 14:  (The purpose of common mental models)
Intention (Why do we have this system?)
Function (How does the system work?)
Form (What does the system look like?)
Condition (What takes place now?)
Describe
Explain
Predict
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preferences, knowing what the others 
in the team will like to do. The implicit 
co-ordination may seem prerequisite 
for a team to be able to handle large 
workloads, time squeeze, and a non-
transparent dynamic environment. 
An internationally published study 
from the Naval Academy that involved 
Norwegian submarine crews has shown 
that crews with the best developed 
common mental models performed 
better (hit more targets). They com-
municated less (implicitly), and were 
less physiologically active (lower heart 
rate). Officers must therefore be able to 
create teams that continually develop 
their common mental models in order 
to gain the best possible situation 
awareness as well as co-ordinated 
efforts in high-intensity periods.
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In the synthesis model we define 
situation awareness as a decisive 
capacity for wise action and adapt-
ability in operational contexts. Without 
a proper understanding of the situation, 
we tend to act too late. We choose the 
wrong strategies or stay passive when 
windows of opportunity open up. We 
have also defined “the seven big ones” 
as important preconditions for good 
situational awareness over time. What 
exactly is situation awareness? 
According to Endsley, we define 
situation awareness as:
“the perception of the elements within a 
volume of time and space, the compre-
hension of their meaning, and the projec-
tion of their status in the near future.” 
For officers and the battle group 
situation awareness constitutes an 
understanding, upon which they base 
their decisions. In this case, we refer to 
knowledge at a given time, and which 
has been built over time. Relating to 
when and where this knowledge is 
to be employed, situation awareness 
thus relates to both past and present. 
In dynamic decision making situation 
awareness can be divided into three 
levels. At the first level the actor preci-
pices his or her environment based on 
relevant information. The next level is 
directed towards integration of diverse 
information from the first level. This will 
thus give the actor a holistic compre-
hension of the environment, and he 
will also be able to compare with the 
objectives in question. The third and 
the highest level of situation awareness 
build on the two other levels including 
the ability to predict occurrences that 
might happen in the near future. A high 
degree of situation awareness will add 
chances that adequate decisions are 
made. Chances are that performances 
will be optimal.
Research shows that lack of situation 
awareness is one of the most important 
causes for human errors and accidents. 
This happens in cases where wrong 
information has been evaluated and 
errors have occurred when critical 
facts or lack of information have been 
recognized and have occurred between 
the actors. All the factors could also 
have been combined. Low situation 
awareness may influence the ability to 
predict future events and in addition 
provoke a reduced execution. Situation 
awareness may be regarded as art of the 
moment; it is what we manage to catch 
in the here and now. A natural reaction if 
one does not manage to mentally adjust 
Chapter 9
Situation awareness
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is to be paralysed. A clear target image is 
an important part of relevant situation 
awareness. A reflected awareness of 
the mission and a superior intention 
for the operation are substantial “filter” 
and “navigational points” in a continual 
orientation and up-dated situation 
awareness. 
It is difficult to arrive at adequate 
situation awareness, and many 
erroneous sources will influence our 
perception. We have, for example, a 
tendency to trust information, which 
will match our pre-conception, and 
to be sceptical to information that 
does not comply with this. Complexity 
implies that we have to count on expe-
riencing situations where new informa-
tion will break with our pre-conception. 
New information might be decisive 
when we aim at situation awareness 
with the closest possible reality match. 
Consequently, inviting and validating 
new and also critical information are 
important capabilities for officers and 
battle groups. If we possess a quali-
tatively better capability at situation 
awareness than does our adversary, we 
shall be able  to transfer this surplus as 
friction, causing our adversary to expe-
rience absurdity which again will turn 
him paralysed. 
Internationally published research from 
the Naval Academy has shown that 
crews’ ability to establish and maintain 
relevant situation awareness will vary, 
at times quite substantially.  Meanwhile, 
research shows that it is possible to 
train capability.  This again implies that 
operation leadership is a capability that 
can be trained i.e. if we understand op-
erational leadership as a capacity that 
contributes to out-manoeuvring our 
adversary on physical, psychological 
and moral arenas.  As described earlier, 
this conditions individual capacities 
within each single crewmember. It also 
conditions mature interaction and col-
lective capacities that will go along with 
situation awareness and vigour. But 
how can this be trained? How can these 
capacities be developed?
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We have now looked at mission based 
leadership philosophy, and the condi-
tions that must be present in order to 
operate well and wisely in demanding 
operational situations. In other words, 
we have described the prerequisites for 
good actions. One question, however, 
still remains unanswered: How do we 
create officers that are situational aware, 
wise, robust, caring and initiating and 
who possess a solid ethical fundament? 
In other words: How do we run opera-
tional leadership training? 
10.1 How do you learn to become an 
officer?
For officers to develop in the right 
direction, we regard the quality of 
the reality and the culture they are 
surrounded by as most important and 
in many ways conditional. This is the 
framework for leadership training. The 
most important leadership develop-
ment initiative that the school can put 
into effect is thus the promotion of 
a culture that preserves the mission 
based leadership and the values of the 
community; if officers for example,e.g. 
do not experience an extended use of 
decentralization and intention based 
leadership, chances are that it is going 
to be very difficult for them to develop 
situational awareness, initiative, in-
dependence and flexibility. A culture 
without cohesion and trusts but with a 
lot of detailed leadership will addition-
ally worsen the picture. Correspond-
ingly, it is difficult to develop officer 
identity and moral consciousness if the 
culture is characterised by individual-
ism and the pursuance of individual 
goals.
In spite of the focus of operational 
leadership in a context characterised 
by complexity, chaos and violence, 
here are clearly leadership elements 
that can also be effectively utilized in 
more normal peacetime operations. 
A culture that is characterised by for 
example e.g. reciprocal trust, strong 
cohesion, decentralization, and col-
lective responsibility for objectives to 
be reached, will be more effective, a 
more motivating workplace, and will 
be more creative than an organization 
characterised by hyper control and 
micro management.
This is in and of it self not enough 
reason to administer this type of 
leadership in “peacetime.” There is 
one other condition that justifies that 
this is not something one embarks on 
when “leaving” and/or moving into 
the spectrum of conflict. Culture does 
Chapter 10
Leader trainingdevelopment – 
how to develop “the good officer”?
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not change “over night,” and it will be 
very difficult, if not impossible, for a 
peacetime organization to handle the 
transition to crisis situations if this way 
of thinking has not characterised daily 
life over a large period of time. When 
we, in addition, are going to run sys-
tematic leadership training, we need 
to come to grips with two fundamental 
questions: what is a human being? 
How does a human being learn?
10.2 Views on humanity and 
learning
We base the following assumptions on 
a positive understanding and respect 
of man. In this we imply that man is to 
be understood as a complex integrity 
of body, reason and emotions where 
each single individual is unique. Man 
is capable of acting good and evil. In 
extreme situations we react differently: 
some will display their better sides 
whereas others will reveal their evil 
ones. Man wishes to work and experi-
ences his or he/her contribution as 
meaningful and important in a larger 
context.
Through seeking and assuming re-
sponsibility, man will develop his/her 
better sides as well as his or her imagi-
nation and creative power. When man 
discovers that it can have influence on 
his situation, he is motivated to assume 
more responsibility. Positive expecta-
tions from the surroundings will 
stimulate the positive sides whereas 
the negative will result in the opposite. 
Man learns by construing his know-
ledge in the interaction with the 
surroundings. The acquisition of know- 
ledge will therefore happen in the 
interaction between what you want 
to gain, the knowledge you already 
possess, the problems you live through, 
the experiences you make as well as 
the conclusions you make, based on 
all this. Man thus plays an active and 
decisive role when it comes to devel-
oping, organizing and implementing 
knowledge. Prior experience, interest 
and commitment are in a continual 
interplay when a new understanding 
of reality is developed. For leadership 
training this has important conse-
Figur 15: Bridge of trust
Trust
Stability Insecurity
Safety Development
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quences. As our point of departure we 
have to take into consideration where 
the counselled is situated; his or her 
experiences vs. his or her approaches 
to reality. We have to try to implement 
the new into a known and familiar 
context, else this might give little 
sense; a fragmented experience with 
less relevance. In the best of cases this 
will constitute short-lived knowledge. 
The trainer’s first task will therefore 
be to aid the counselled in creating 
images of future stances (goals), which 
will add coherence and meaning as 
well as direction, relevance, interest 
and commitment.
10.3. Learning as imbalance and 
trust
The driving force in the officers’ 
leadership training is the tension that 
erupts between the existing and the 
new experience and knowledge. It 
is therefore possible to claim that 
learning is leaving the safe with its 
large degree of stability, and entering 
into the uncertainty, a world of which 
you have no knowledge. The coun-
selled will therefore for a short period 
of time be in transit “without foothold.” 
To master this uncertainty is learning 
in itself. Such mastery is important and 
necessary because it touches on the 
core of this approach. The counselled is 
not supposed to believe that he or she 
has the correct answer, but will rather 
“gain foothold” with an inner safety, in 
which the he or she understands what 
happens in the exterior dynamic world, 
quicker and more correct than the 
adversary. The social context where the 
officers are supposed to learn to master 
this, is of great importance when he or 
she jumps into the insecure, trying to 
construe a new reality. This is illustrated 
in figure 15 as the bridge if confidence.
In a learning environment where some 
of the experiences to be undertaken 
are both frightening and unpleasant, 
it is the trust between all involved 
that manages to get the counselled 
“over the bridge” from the safe to the 
insecure. This is essential because it 
is in the insecure that learning and 
development take place. This is how 
one “learns to learn.” Accordingly, it 
is difficult to envision a movement 
towards increased independence, 
initiative and vigour without the afore-
mentioned setting the standard for the 
approach.
10.4 Social interactionplay – an 
intensifier
When people meet as learners in a 
learning process, social interactionplay 
takes place. This creates possibilities for 
a larger understanding and develop-
ment. We perceive and assess situa-
tions in different ways. If we therefore 
underway and afterwards try to forge 
a common outlook, this will increase 
our own and others’ learning of what 
is really going on in the environment. 
In other words, the counselled will see 
new tensions between what he or she 
knew and what others have construed 
reality to be like. 
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Good skills and processes that address 
this in a team context will be decisive 
in order that officers arrive at the best 
decisions and actions in difficult situa-
tions. This is, in addition, very important 
for how to learn about the individual’s 
possibility to contribute to learning, 
both to one’s own and others’ learning. 
This is not central only to leadership 
training, but to leadership theory in 
general. Thus the notion “learning-
ship” may be attached to leadership. 
Understanding oneself in interac-
tionplay with others is something to 
which everybody needs to develop 
a relationship. Here nobody can turn 
master, only better. The types of situ-
ations that await an officer are rarely 
characterised by solitude. Missions are 
to be solved in interaction with others, 
and performance and results are often 
directly linked to how well one masters 
this interaction. The social interaction, 
that one is part of, has significance for 
how one thinks and action when alone. 
This at influences the thoughts and, 
emotions, and creating a language 
for the inner conversation, and will 
subsequently be able to give perspec-
tives (voices) when one is faced with 
situations alone. 
10.5. Experience-based learning
With the aforementioned as backdrop, 
one can might statesay that learning 
happens as a transformation of concrete 
experience into an increased/altered 
understanding of reality. Construction 
takes place in an active processing of 
impressions and reflections. The core 
Figure 16: Experience based learning
Concrete experiences
 
 Try out new  
images, concepts in 
new situations
Observations and 
reflections
Create new  
concepts and  
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of the reflection makes it possible for 
the counselled to draw his/her own 
conclusions of the experiences that he 
or she has made. He or she can then 
face new situations with these conclu-
sions.
Concrete experiences are the core of 
what is to be learned. It adds structure, 
coherence and a subjective approach 
to the concept. In order to learn ef-
fectively, it is required that the officer:
•   is totally involved in the new experi-
ences, is open without preconceived 
opinions
•   reflects upon and regards his/her 
own experiences from several perspec-
tive (Reflective perspective))
• develops notions that integrate obser-
vations into logical theories (Abstract 
conceptual formation)
•   is able to employ these theories at 
a later stage when decisions are to be 
made and problems are to be solved 
(New experiences)
In order to develop leaders withwho 
have a high degree of transitory 
capabilities, the counselled must be 
met with a learning environment 
with large enough action space. In 
this action space the officers must 
360 degrees` 
assesment
Home exam in 
military leadership
Conversation and 
written feedback 
from counsellor
New action plan for 
self-development to 
be shared with 
individual squad
Reections and 
generalisations
Military 
leadership theory
Situations during 
varions exercises
LF counselling after 
completed mission “Hot Seat” after 
completed exercise
The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy`s relationship 
to experience based learning
Figure 17: An example of experience based learning at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy.
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learn to act independently; they must 
interpret targets, identify what one 
needs to learn, they must develop as 
human beings, develop new strategies 
for problem solving, must succeed 
(master), take initiatives and be 
creative, must develop knowledge, fail, 
reflect, make their own experiences 
etc. All this contributes to developing 
an understanding of what leadership 
development is, in addition to being 
an improved ability to lead. Trainers 
must be able to help officers develop 
relevant images of what has been 
attempted to obtain; the goals for the 
development. If these are not present, 
it is going to be difficult to experience 
relevant learning needs, in addition to 
developing a need to face them. 
Additionally, the leader developer 
must contribute to making the coun-
selled see the difference between 
today’s situation and a desired one. 
Subsequently, the counselled must 
have the opportunity to havedo their 
experiences in ever-new situations.
The mantra has got to be a learning en-
vironment where everybody is allowed 
to try and fail. Trainers have to focus 
on the officers’ reasons for the choices 
that are being made rather than on 
preliminary ready-made answers. The 
experience of a back up key answer 
will reduce creativity and action room. 
The goal is to create an officer who 
continually reflects on his or her own 
practise with the intention to create 
Challenge SupportAssess
Ability to learn
Variation in 
developmental experiences
Leadership
development
Organizatorial 
context
Figur 18:  Conditions for experience-based learning.
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future realities (i.e. good actions). If we 
manage to create reflective practitio-
ners through our leadership activities, 
we have succeeded. For the trainers at 
the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy 
it is important to give officers a model 
of what they are supposed to strive 
for. This should be done to stimulate 
an experience and an understanding 
of relevant learning needs. Hence we 
need to create pre-conditions in order 
to develop relevant models of what 
they need to acquire. In addition, we 
need to make officers experience the 
distance between what they already 
know and what is to be acquired. 
Without this, it is going to be difficult to 
define one’s own learning needs. Sub-
sequently we must give officers pos-
sibility to make their own experiences 
in ever new situations. This dynamics is 
illustrated in figure 18.
The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy 
must be able to challenge the officer 
and make him or her realize the dif-
ference between where he or she is 
and where he or she is going. Our 
challenges have to be of such a nature 
and content that the officers will expe-
rience this as an imbalance that he or 
she will strive to redress through new 
knowledge and development. 
We must be able to assess the progress 
that each individual displays and 
express and decide accordingly. The 
officer must receive the support and 
trust that is necessary in order to dare 
venturing into new experiences.
In this lies also help for observation, 
reflection and thoughts regarding 
the conclusions of experiences. The 
officer must possess capability and 
willingness to learn to meet experi-
ences that gives possibility for mastery 
while simultaneously being varied 
enough to ensure new learning. If the 
entire learning environment at the 
Naval Academy (including systems of 
rewards, academic professional loads 
etc) supports this, and everybody pulls 
in the same direction, we have a pos-
sibility to develop officers to become 
leaders.
10.6 Realism – a necessity
As shown, the “social coherence” 
plays an important role. The same 
applies to “physical coherence.” With 
physical coherence we understand 
the physical environment where the 
training takes place (e.g. in the machine 
room or in the OPS room). The Physical 
coherence therefore needs to be as 
realistic as possible. This is where the 
acquired knowledge is supposed to 
be applied.  Research shows that if one 
has practised a situation, and happens 
to encounter an equivalent situation 
in the future, the possibilities for 
remembering and implementing the 
knowledge is far greater if the training 
has been perceived as realistic. Realism 
and coherence are therefore essential 
and will increase the profit of learning. 
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10.7 . “Freeplay”  as exercise concept
“Teach students to make quick decisions 
though a coherent logical thought 
process, while under pressure (William 
Lind).
Military exercises are often conducted 
according to a detailed scenario. 
Moments are recorded according to 
a set of activities and time schemes. 
What happens is governed by a game 
staff where the assessments of the 
individual players and their actions 
have minor influence on game 
procedure. In spite of the fact that this 
may train certain levels of merit and 
technique, this approach will often 
lead to predictability of context as well 
as preconceived solutions thought out 
by the game staff. To bring out players’ 
creativity, initiative and assessment 
will thus be difficult. Focus is often on 
cracking the code, finding the solutions 
conjured up by the game staff (i.e. the 
school’s solution) rather than out- 
manoeuvring an adversary. For the 
Naval Academy this represents a large 
challenge because experience shows 
that officers rather look for the school’s 
key than acting creatively, testing 
whatever situation they are faced with 
(cf. the Liebergbekk commission)
In order that Naval Academy officers 
develop mastering and know-how for 
dealing with non-predictability and 
pressure (war= chaos and complexity), 
the Academy faces a big challenge. 
Imbedded in our understanding of 
war is the notion that crisis and war 
represent an interpersonal activity. 
This implies that you fight or compete 
against another will (brain). In other 
words, you do not know what he or 
she thinks or feels. Training at facing 
another’s dynamic wills is therefore 
important. In your own predictability 
lies the potential for becoming out ma-
noeuvred. To train in an environment 
that is predictable will easily create 
officers with reduced capabilities for 
creativity and situational adjustment. 
One way of creating a realistic training 
is thus to conduct or control the 
exercise in the purpose of opening a 
realistic fight between diverse wills 
in a dynamic process. The idea is that 
the exercise will to the largest possible 
degree be governed by players’ choices 
and actions. Now the game staff will 
function more as scenario mediators, 
defining frame-work, rand recording 
actions that are rather consequences 
of players’ choices than preconceived 
solutions.
Our approach to exercises in opera-
tional leadership is therefore, by and 
large, the notion of “free play.”  The 
thinking and initiative of the officers 
constitute the focal points. They will 
face numerous players (wills) who 
they will try to confuse, surprise and 
out-manoeuvre. In this encounter 
where surroundings are characterised 
by uncertainty and rapid changes, the 
officers will face the largest possible 
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number of situations where decisions 
(without preconceived answers) are 
to be made under pressure, such that 
their ability to resonate, assess and 
make initiatives are challenged and 
trained. At this point only, they can 
begin to understand what they will 
encounter in a real situation, being 
able to start practising the handling of 
such situations. It is of vital importance 
that officers are never criticized for 
having made the wrong decisions, 
but they are always accounted for 
on the basis of responsibility in case 
decisions are not made in time (action 
inertia), or if they are not able to give 
logical and comprehensive reasons 
for their choices. In contexts where 
the Academy manages to instill this in 
shorter sequences or through lengthy 
exercises, the officers will be able 
to raise their consciousness on how 
they think, feel and act in pressured 
situations. This will constitute a further 
base for training and development. In 
our opinion this is a far better point of 
departure for counselling and theory 
construction (understanding) than by 
relating only to what they think, feel 
and do.
This approach represents a great 
challenge for the Naval Academy’s 
staff. Often we find ourselves situated 
between individual needs for control 
and security on the one hand, and the 
necessity of letting the game develop 
freely to create an arena for realistic 
training on the other.
10.8 “Suspense  of disbelief” as 
operational learning competence
Military operations often involve the 
use of arms and a realistic danger off 
the loss of lives. This possibility is near 
approximately impossible to fully 
recreate in peacetime based leadership 
training. All military peacetime training 
will, in other words, be characterised 
by a type of unrealism.
In order to meet this challenge it is of 
course possible to develop exercises 
that are as realistic as possible, 
possibly on arenas that will generate 
experiences of fear, and which offer 
realistic complexity (as in e.g. “free 
play” exercises). Another approach 
to increase realism during exercise 
is to stimulate the officers’ ability to 
cognitively repress the fact that their 
experiences are situated within a safe 
peace-oriented exercise. This ability 
can be called “dispense of disbelief.”
The notion “suspense of disbelief” 
origins from film theory and is directed 
towards the phenomenon when the 
film audience is being seduced by a film 
(if it is a good one). As you sit down, you 
stop reflecting on the fact that what 
you see is fiction. The set you watch is 
in reality surrounded by cameramen, 
light technicians and staff. But when 
you buy the ticket, you decide to let 
yourself be carried away. You park the 
part of your brain that says that you 
now watch fiction (unless you decide 
to enter the film critic’s role). Next your 
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experience in the theatre takes on the 
quality as if you were there. Your pulses 
rises radically in dramatic scene, you 
are moved to tears when key persons 
die etc. In other words, the movie 
touches you as if it were real. The same 
capacities ought to be stimulated as a 
part of making exercises more realistic, 
and hence increasing the learning. The 
officers ought to be challenged when it 
comes to empathy. 
Attempts to be up to the tricks of 
the movie staff as well as attempting 
to place oneself in the role as the 
observing outsider, who is about to 
assess realism and relevance, ought 
to be discouraged. One should rather 
stimulate the individual to go for the 
full package. Try to stop evaluation 
thoughts and mental flight away from 
the setting in order to experience the 
exercise in the best possible realistic 
manner. This way stress reactions and 
complexities will strongly increase, 
and you will most like profit from the 
exercise in a similar way.
10.9 Theory and practice – the 
problem of transfer
The decisive about learning is that “the 
acquiesced things come out of the 
head (and hands) at the right time and 
in the right situation”; i.e. like a type of 
wisdom. The officers have to acquiesce 
what that is transferable to situations 
they will meet in their future service. In 
order that such a transfer is successful, 
the officer must have acquiesced the 
necessary knowledge. 
Exam results, however, are not 
necessary the best indicator of such 
knowledge. Transfer of knowledge 
between various situations will 
primarily happen when these situa-
tions share many similarities (this we 
call close transfer). A large challenge 
regarding when it comes to transfer 
of knowledge is the situations where 
the learning situation and the practical 
implementation share few similarities. 
In order that this type of transfer (also 
called distance transfer) is understood, 
the learning material must be under-
stood.  Understanding has to do with 
being able to explain and argue why 
and how models and concepts are 
used related to practical tasks and 
problems. The ability to learn by heart 
is not the same as to have understand-
ing. The Navy Academy’s Intent is to ac-
commodate learning situations which 
will provoke, promote and support the 
officer’s understanding of leadership 
and social interplay, and which makes 
it possible to transfer experiences 
made at the Naval Academy onto an 
operational setting.
10.10 The learning environment – 
the importance of interacting arenas.
Most pedagogues in the Armed Forces 
agree that good learning requires 
reciprocal interchange action between 
experience and theoretical reflection. 
From the Officer Candidates’ School we 
know this as a well-established fact. It 
is, however, more difficult to make this 
happen in practical life. It requires in-
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teractionplay between three learning 
environment arenas: 1) education 
(theory) 2) counselling (synthesis) and 
3) exercises (experience). Education 
and theory will here serve to interpret 
experience, and providing a knowledge 
basis for the practical training. Exercises 
are supposed to produce realistic and 
challenging experiences. Counselling 
will help the young officers to match 
experience and theory in such a way 
that meaning and coherence are 
bridged; in other words, a builder of a 
bridge builder role. 
Two aspects have to be present in the 
relationship between these arenas 
if the learning environment can be 
understood as stimulating for leader-
ship development. First, the extension 
and the weighting ought to be 
relative relatively even similar. Second, 
there must be a continual exchange 
between arenas in order that synergy 
is produced. Figure 20 illustrates an 
imbalanced learning environments 
characterised by large differences in 
the weighting of the three arenas. The 
stippled lines indicate that the learning 
environment is characterised by a 
small interaction play tied to common 
processes and goals. Here the learning 
documentation will by and large be tied 
to education in theory on a par with 
civilian colleges and universities. Exam 
results are the only decisive criteria for 
proficiency. Exercises and counselling 
are in these learning environments 
only marginal in size. Theoretical 
studies characterise the  study week 
(fig 19). This pretty much harmonizes 
with the new focus on civilian system 
of weighting that we have observed in 
military education lately. Its drawback, 
however, takes places when the theory 
is cut off from the field of experience. 
The end result turns out to be” archive 
knowledge” that might explain why we 
lost a vessel, but which is less worth in 
the situation when the vessel founders 
shipwrecks. In other words, this all 
results in the education of theoreti-
cians, not reflective practitioners.
We also observe that theory and 
learning only to a small degree will 
interchange and interplay in exercises 
and counselling as in the situation 
illustrated in figure 20 (contrary to 
figure 19). Less exchange between 
exercise and counselling may also 
lead to that important experience 
being worked through in debriefing 
and conversations of errors of action. 
Through relevant questions, especially 
as memory for the officer who has 
forgotten or repressed various experi-
ences, the counsellor will be able 
to stimulate to healthy shame that 
contributes to development, and to 
feelings of mastery – and reflection 
that will create better officers.
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Fig 19: Balanced acquisition environment -  high exchange
Education Training
Counselling
Fig 20 : Non balanced acquisition environment -  low exchange
Education Training
Counselling
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